{"id":300,"date":"2019-01-27T21:25:14","date_gmt":"2019-01-27T18:25:14","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/94.237.85.66\/?p=300"},"modified":"2019-02-16T02:27:24","modified_gmt":"2019-02-15T23:27:24","slug":"libya-yol-ayriminda","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/trockist.net\/index.php\/2019\/01\/27\/libya-yol-ayriminda\/","title":{"rendered":"Libya yol ayr\u0131m\u0131nda"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Simon Assaf<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ortado\u011fu’da devrimler, de\u011fi\u015fmez zannedilen b\u00fct\u00fcn bir b\u00f6lge boyunca ve kendi \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 ad\u0131na hareket etmekten aciz say\u0131lan insanlar\u0131n m\u00fcdahalesiyle, bir g\u00f6k g\u00fcr\u00fclt\u00fcs\u00fc gibi patlad\u0131. Devrimlerin tarihe g\u00f6m\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fc fikri art\u0131k inzivaya \u00e7ekildi. Gen\u00e7lerin eylemleri ve protestolar\u0131n cesurlu\u011fu, on y\u0131llard\u0131r bask\u0131 ve retorik \u00fczerine kurulu rejimleri parampar\u00e7a etti. Bu \u201cgen\u00e7lik devrimleri\u201d t\u00fcm b\u00f6lgeyi ortak talepler etraf\u0131nda birle\u015ftirdi: i\u015f, onurlu bir ya\u015fam, \u00f6zg\u00fcrl\u00fck, demokrasi; bask\u0131ya, yolsuzlu\u011fa ve yozla\u015fmaya kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadele. Devrimler, Arap i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fck bir kesimini sarsarak, onu uykusundan uyand\u0131rd\u0131.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Arap rejimlerinin, onlara uzun bir ya\u015fam s\u00fcresi sa\u011flayan \u00fc\u00e7 temel dayana\u011f\u0131 bulunuyordu. Rejimler kendi halklar\u0131yla, kalk\u0131nma ve belirli d\u00fczeyde bir ekonomik g\u00fcvenlik vaat eden bir toplumsal s\u00f6zle\u015fme yapt\u0131lar. Bu toplumsal s\u00f6zle\u015fme, neoliberal reformlarla sars\u0131ld\u0131 ve zay\u0131flad\u0131. Rejimlerin ikinci dayanak noktas\u0131, monar\u015filer ve cumhuriyet y\u00f6netimleri i\u00e7in ayn\u0131 \u015fekilde ge\u00e7erli olmak \u00fczere, emperyalizmle bar\u0131\u015fmak ad\u0131na Filistin i\u00e7in iki devletli \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm \u00f6nerisini kabul etmi\u015f olmalar\u0131yd\u0131. Ekonomik karga\u015fa ve politik ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131k, rejimlerin elinde tek bir dayanak b\u0131rak\u0131yordu: bask\u0131 ve \u015fiddet mekanizmalar\u0131. \u015e\u00fcphesiz, rejimlerin dayand\u0131\u011f\u0131 bu \u00fc\u00e7 s\u00fctunun temelleri, son on y\u0131lda ger\u00e7ekle\u015fen derin sosyal ve ideolojik de\u011fi\u015fimlerle sars\u0131ld\u0131. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

M\u0131s\u0131r ve Tunus\u2019taki dramatik geli\u015fmeler, ayaklanan kitlelerin seferberlikleriyle kitle grevlerinin bile\u015fiminin rejimleri ve iktidarlar\u0131 devirebilece\u011fini kan\u0131tlad\u0131. Bu s\u00fcre\u00e7 Libya i\u00e7in de ge\u00e7erliydi fakat, rejimin do\u011fas\u0131 ve \u00f6rg\u00fctl\u00fc bir muhalefetin bulunmay\u0131\u015f\u0131, g\u00fcvenlik ayg\u0131tlar\u0131n\u0131n kesin bir yenilgisine imkan vermedi. Libya devrimi zor ko\u015fullar alt\u0131nda y\u00fckseldi. Rejime g\u00f6bekten ba\u011fl\u0131 da olsa sendikalar\u0131n var oldu\u011fu ve devrimin \u00e7ekim merkezleri haline geldi\u011fi Tunus’tan veya muhalefetin siyasi hareketler ve g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131 etraf\u0131nda birle\u015fti\u011fi M\u0131s\u0131r’dan farkl\u0131 olarak Libya, \u00f6rg\u00fctl\u00fc bir i\u00e7 muhalefete sahip de\u011fildi. Libya devrimi \u00f6rg\u00fctlenmenin en ilkel bi\u00e7imleriyle i\u015fe ba\u015flamak zorundayd\u0131. Herhangi bir muhalefetin bulunmay\u0131\u015f\u0131 ayn\u0131 zamanda, rejimin diyalog ve reform y\u00f6ntemleriyle uzla\u015fma arama imk\u00e2nlar\u0131n\u0131 da daraltt\u0131. B\u00f6lgedeki devrim g\u00fc\u00e7lerinin geli\u015fmesindeki gelgitleri belirleyebilmek i\u00e7in elimizde lineer \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcler bulunmuyor. Bu gelgitler -Tunus ve M\u0131s\u0131r’da ba\u015far\u0131, Libya ve Bahreyn’de yenilgi- devrimin acil g\u00f6revleriyle kitlelerin devrimden beklentileri aras\u0131nda bir u\u00e7urum yaratt\u0131. Ve bu belirsizlikler, ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n bir ku\u015fak i\u00e7in yenilgi haline gelece\u011fi \u00f6l\u00fcm kal\u0131m anlar\u0131nda ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bingazi\u2019de 17 \u015eubat 2011 tarihinde ba\u015flayan ayaklanman\u0131n amac\u0131, \u00fclkeyi Bat\u0131 emperyalizmine teslim etmek de\u011fildi. Fakat, \u00f6zellikle emperyalizme kar\u015f\u0131 olan sol i\u00e7in, Libya Devrimi biri dizi karma\u015f\u0131k soru ortaya \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131. Tunus, Bahreyn, M\u0131s\u0131r ve Yemen emperyalizmin \u00e7eperi alt\u0131ndaki \u00fclkelerdi. Buradaki devrimler Bat\u0131’n\u0131n pen\u00e7esinden kurtulu\u015fun bir par\u00e7as\u0131 olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclebilirdi. Ama devrimciler Suriye ve Libya\u2019daki ayaklanmalar kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda nas\u0131l bir tutum almal\u0131yd\u0131? Zira, bask\u0131c\u0131 diktat\u00f6rl\u00fckler olmalar\u0131na ra\u011fmen bu rejimlerin, emperyalizme kar\u015f\u0131 baz\u0131 muhalif \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015flar\u0131 s\u00f6z konusuydu.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Libya devrimi ikinci bir sorun daha yaratt\u0131. Ayaklanmalara d\u00f6n\u00fck yayg\u0131n bir sempati ve destek olmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen, emperyalizm bir kez s\u00fcrece d\u00e2hil olduktan sonra, solun bir kesimi Kaddafi’nin rejimine destek sunmaya ba\u015flarken, bir di\u011fer kesimse yeniden piyasaya s\u00fcr\u00fclen \u201cinsani m\u00fcdahale\u201d dogmas\u0131ndan medet umarak emperyalizmin ger\u00e7ek hedeflerini g\u00f6z ard\u0131 etti. Aralar\u0131nda benim de oldu\u011fum devrimin \u00e7o\u011fu destek\u00e7isi, devrimin emperyalizmle l\u00fczumsuz bir anla\u015fmaya zorland\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve panik i\u00e7inde Bat\u0131’ya askeri m\u00fcdahale \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131s\u0131 yap\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 savundu. O d\u00f6nemde, zorluklar\u0131na ra\u011fmen Libya devriminin destek ad\u0131na kom\u015fular\u0131na d\u00f6nmesi gerekti\u011fini belirttik. Mevcut durumda ise bu tart\u0131\u015fma art\u0131k soyut bir nitelik ta\u015f\u0131yor: Bir m\u00fcdahale ger\u00e7ekle\u015fti ve Bat\u0131, devrimi ray\u0131ndan \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131. Fakat Kaddafi’nin \u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fc ve rejiminin sonlanmas\u0131n\u0131 takiben, devrimin \u00f6nderli\u011fi sorunu yeniden su y\u00fcz\u00fcne \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Devrim bir s\u00fcre\u00e7tir. Eski d\u00fczen ile giderek b\u00fcy\u00fcyen de\u011fi\u015fim arzusu aras\u0131ndaki dolays\u0131z \u00e7at\u0131\u015fman\u0131n bir ifadesidir. Devrimler yeni sosyal ili\u015fkilerle birlikte yeni bir \u00e7a\u011f\u0131n habercisidir. Do\u011fas\u0131 gere\u011fi bir devrim, sokaklar, fabrika, ofis, okul, ekonomi ve kaynaklar \u00fczerindeki kontrol i\u00e7in bir dizi krizin yol a\u00e7t\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir meydan okumad\u0131r. Devrim s\u00fcrecinde milyonlar kendi \u00e7evresindeki d\u00fcnyay\u0131 de\u011fi\u015ftiren ve \u015fekillendiren bir faaliyet i\u00e7ine girer ve bunu yaparken kendi bilincini y\u00fckseltir. Bu s\u00fcre\u00e7 Libya’da ayaklanman\u0131n ilk g\u00fcnlerinde i\u015flemdeydi ve i\u00e7 sava\u015f\u0131n sonu olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclen Trablus\u2019taki ikinci ayaklanmayla birlikte tekrar ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. Ama yol boyunca devrim, s\u00fcrecin kom\u015fu \u00fclkelerindeki gibi geli\u015fmesini engelleyecek ve kendisini k\u0131s\u0131tlayacak uzla\u015fmalara zorland\u0131.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bu makale, Libya tarihinin veya ayaklanma ve i\u00e7 sava\u015f s\u00fcrecinin eksiksiz bir tarihi de\u011fildir. G\u00f6stermeyi umdu\u011fum \u015fey, Kaddafi rejiminin Libya’n\u0131n ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kazand\u0131\u011f\u0131 d\u00f6nemin ard\u0131ndan geli\u015fen bir kitle hareketi \u00fczerinde y\u00fckseldi\u011fidir. Onun darbesi bu devrimci dalgaya bir son verdi ve rejimin kulland\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00f6ylemlere ra\u011fmen in\u015fa etti\u011fi rejim, yeni bir egemen s\u0131n\u0131f yaratmaya d\u00f6n\u00fck politikalar\u0131na muhalif b\u00fct\u00fcn kesimleri ezip ge\u00e7ti. 1980’lerde Libya’n\u0131n Bat\u0131’yla ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131 gerilimlerde devrimci sosyalistler, emperyalizmin \u00fclkeye d\u00f6n\u00fck planlar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131lar fakat, Kaddafi\u2019nin anti-emperyalizmi Filistin ve L\u00fcbnan’da \u00f6zg\u00fcn direni\u015f hareketlerinin geli\u015fmesinin \u00f6n\u00fcnde bir engel oldu ve b\u00fct\u00fcn s\u00f6ylemlerine ra\u011fmen, ger\u00e7ekte daima Bat\u0131’yla petrol anla\u015fmalar\u0131n\u0131 devam ettirmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Benzer \u015fekilde, kulland\u0131\u011f\u0131 Pan-Afrikac\u0131 s\u00f6ylemin ard\u0131nda yatan ger\u00e7ek neden, \u00c7ad’\u0131n kuzeyini i\u015fgal etme hedefiydi. Ve George Bush’un \u201cter\u00f6rizme kar\u015f\u0131 sava\u015f\u201d ilan\u0131n\u0131 takip ederek Kaddafi, Fransa, Britanya ve ABD’yle tekrar bar\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Huzursuzlu\u011fun ilk i\u015faretlerinin ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131\u011f\u0131 d\u00f6nemde, Kaddafi ve ailesi Bat\u0131 ba\u015fkentlerinin d\u00fczenli bir ziyaret\u00e7isiydi ve rejimi emperyalizmle bar\u0131\u015f i\u00e7erisindeydi. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0130talyan \u0130\u015fgali: \u201cD\u00f6rd\u00fcnc\u00fc K\u0131y\u0131\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u015eu anda Libya olarak ifade edilen b\u00f6lgenin s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131, yirminci y\u00fczy\u0131l\u0131n ba\u015f\u0131nda Bat\u0131l\u0131 s\u00f6m\u00fcrgeci g\u00fc\u00e7ler taraf\u0131ndan \u00e7izildi. Modern Libya birbirinden farkl\u0131 \u00fc\u00e7 b\u00f6lgeden olu\u015fmaktad\u0131r: Bat\u0131da, ba\u015fkenti Trablus olan Trablusgarp; do\u011fuda ba\u015fkenti Bingazi ile Sirenayka; ve g\u00fcneyde u\u00e7suz bucaks\u0131z \u00e7\u00f6lleriyle Fezzan. Farkl\u0131 k\u00fclt\u00fcrel ve etnik tarihleriyle bu b\u00f6lgeler, Osmanl\u0131 \u0130mparatorlu\u011fu’nun unutulmu\u015f s\u0131n\u0131r b\u00f6lgelerinin par\u00e7alar\u0131yd\u0131. Bu imparatorluk par\u00e7aland\u0131k\u00e7a, s\u00f6m\u00fcrgeci g\u00fc\u00e7ler devreye girdi. Bug\u00fcnk\u00fc modern Libya’y\u0131 olu\u015fturan bu geni\u015f ve fakir b\u00f6lgeler (b\u00f6lgenin sadece y\u00fczde biri tar\u0131m i\u00e7in elveri\u015fliydi)(1)<\/strong>, ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta s\u00f6m\u00fcrgeci g\u00fc\u00e7ler i\u00e7in pek de \u00e7ekici yerler de\u011fildi ve Afrika’daki s\u00f6m\u00fcrgecilik yar\u0131\u015f\u0131nda u\u011fruna m\u00fccadele edilecek en son b\u00f6lgelerdi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

S\u00f6m\u00fcrgecilik yar\u0131\u015f\u0131na ge\u00e7 d\u00e2hil olan \u0130talya, imparatorluk in\u015fa etme stratejisinin bir par\u00e7as\u0131 olarak, 1911 y\u0131l\u0131nda \u201cD\u00f6rd\u00fcnc\u00fc K\u0131y\u0131\u201d [Trablusgarp \u00e7.] olarak bilinen topraklar\u0131 ele ge\u00e7irme \u015fans\u0131 yakalad\u0131. 70 bin \u0130talyan s\u00f6m\u00fcrgeci, \u00e7o\u011funlu\u011fu Trablus’a olmak \u00fczere Trablusgarp’a yerle\u015firken, 40 bin kadar\u0131 da do\u011fu b\u00f6lgesine kuruldu.(2)<\/strong> S\u00f6m\u00fcrge y\u00f6netimi do\u011fulu a\u015firetler aras\u0131nda, Suudi Arabistan’daki Vahabizm’e yak\u0131n Senusiye tarikat\u0131n\u0131n takip\u00e7isi \u00d6mer Muhtar taraf\u0131ndan y\u00f6netilen bir isyan\u0131n k\u0131v\u0131lc\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7akt\u0131. Muhtar 1931’de yakalan\u0131p 20 bin taraftar\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6n\u00fcnde as\u0131lana dek, 8 y\u0131l boyunca s\u00f6m\u00fcrgecilere kar\u015f\u0131 y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclen gerilla sava\u015f\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6nderli\u011fini yapt\u0131.(3)<\/strong> \u0130talya’n\u0131n Libya’da y\u00fcr\u00fctt\u00fc\u011f\u00fc sava\u015f, fa\u015fist diktat\u00f6r Benito Mussolini d\u00f6neminde giderek daha kanl\u0131 bir hal ald\u0131. Bask\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6zellikle vah\u015file\u015fti\u011fi bir d\u00f6nemde, \u0130talyan fa\u015fistleri 12 bin Sireneykal\u0131y\u0131 infaz ettiler.(4) <\/strong>Yakla\u015f\u0131k bir milyon Libyal\u0131n\u0131n ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131 san\u0131lan 1912\u20131943 y\u0131llar\u0131 aras\u0131nda, tahminen 300 bin Libyal\u0131 \u0130talyan birlikleri taraf\u0131ndan katledildi. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0130talyan s\u00f6m\u00fcrge y\u00f6netimi \u0130kinci D\u00fcnya Sava\u015f\u0131 s\u0131ras\u0131nda, m\u00fcttefiklerin i\u015fgali ile sona erdi. Kral \u0130dris’in y\u00f6netimindeki Libya Birle\u015fik Krall\u0131\u011f\u0131, Birle\u015fmi\u015f Milletler taraf\u0131ndan 1951 y\u0131l\u0131nda ilan edildi. Senusiye tarikat\u0131n\u0131n kurucular\u0131n\u0131n soyundan gelen Kral, yar\u0131m y\u00fczy\u0131l s\u00fcren s\u00f6m\u00fcrgecilik taraf\u0131ndan zay\u0131flat\u0131lm\u0131\u015f ve d\u00fcnya sava\u015f\u0131nda enkaz haline getirilmi\u015f bir \u00fclkeyi devrald\u0131 (Kuzey Afrika’da s\u00fcren sava\u015f boyunca Bingazi binden fazla bombard\u0131mana maruz kald\u0131). Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k d\u00f6neminde \u00fclkede ki\u015fi ba\u015f\u0131na d\u00fc\u015fen y\u0131ll\u0131k ortama gelir 16 sterlin d\u00fczeyinde iken, n\u00fcfusun y\u00fczde 95’inden fazlas\u0131 okuma yazma bilmiyordu.(5)<\/strong> Ulusal gelir, Britanya ve ABD’nin, \u00fclkenin Akdeniz k\u0131y\u0131s\u0131 boyunca uzanan askeri \u00fcsleri i\u00e7in \u00f6dedikleri kiraya ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131yd\u0131. 1952 y\u0131l\u0131nda Sirte havzas\u0131nda ke\u015ffedilen petrol, Libya’y\u0131 d\u00fcnyan\u0131n en b\u00fcy\u00fck d\u00f6rd\u00fcnc\u00fc petrol \u00fcreticisi konumuna ta\u015f\u0131d\u0131.(6)<\/strong> Kral \u00fclkeyi Bat\u0131l\u0131 petrol \u015firketlerine a\u00e7t\u0131. Ke\u015ffedilen ucuz ve y\u00fcksek kaliteli petrol \u00fclke ekonomisinin d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcm\u00fcne neden oldu fakat, elde edilen yeni zenginlik kral\u0131n yak\u0131n \u00e7evresini kapsayan bir patronaj a\u011f\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan payla\u015f\u0131ld\u0131. 1960’l\u0131 y\u0131llarda \u00fclke petrol gelirleri sayesinde ciddi bir ekonomik y\u00fckseli\u015f ya\u015farken, halktaki huzursuzlu\u011fun ilk k\u0131p\u0131rt\u0131lar\u0131 da hissedilmeye ba\u015fl\u0131yordu. 1960’lar\u0131n ilk y\u0131llar\u0131ndaki \u00f6\u011frenci eylemleri ve isyanlar\u0131, krala kar\u015f\u0131 bir muhalefetin olu\u015fumunu m\u00fcjdeliyordu. Bu hareket b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde, Cemal Abd\u00fcl Nas\u0131r’\u0131n M\u0131s\u0131r’da ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirdi\u011fi devrimin etkisi alt\u0131ndayd\u0131. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

1952’de iktidar\u0131 ele ge\u00e7irdikten sonra Nas\u0131r, stratejik \u00f6nemdeki S\u00fcvey\u015f Kanal\u0131 da d\u00e2hil olmak \u00fczere, M\u0131s\u0131r ekonomisinin \u00f6nemli bir b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc kamula\u015ft\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Nas\u0131r’\u0131n ulusal kalk\u0131nma modeli ve Frans\u0131z ve \u0130ngiliz emperyalizmlerine meydan okumas\u0131, petrol\u00fcn bulunmas\u0131yla olu\u015fan yeni zenginli\u011fin \u00fclkenin ekonomik kalk\u0131nmas\u0131 i\u00e7in kullan\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 talep eden Libyal\u0131lar aras\u0131nda da yank\u0131 buldu. 1969’daki kitlesel seferberlikler, petrol sekt\u00f6r\u00fcnde ger\u00e7ekle\u015fen bir genel grevin tetikleyicisi oldu. Geli\u015fen hareket g\u00fcvenlik g\u00fc\u00e7leriyle a\u00e7\u0131k bir \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmaya girdik\u00e7e, kral\u0131n otoritesi \u00e7\u00f6kt\u00fc ve birlikleri onu terk etti. 1 Eyl\u00fcl 1969’da, \u00d6zg\u00fcr Subaylar olarak bilinen (resmi ad\u0131 Devrimci Komuta Konseyi) Kaddafi’nin \u00f6nderli\u011findeki bir grup subay kral\u0131 taht\u0131ndan indirdi. Darbenin liderleri Libya’n\u0131n, emperyalizme ve \u0130srail’e kar\u015f\u0131 muhalefet eden Arap cephesinin bir par\u00e7as\u0131 olaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ilan etti. Subaylar, Amerikan ve \u0130ngiliz birliklerinin derhal \u00fclkeden \u00e7ekilmesini ve askeri \u00fcslerinin kapat\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 talep etti. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cemahiriye Efsanesi<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Darbe kitlesel t\u00f6renlerle kutland\u0131 ve darbenin ard\u0131ndan insanlar, Libya\u2019n\u0131n M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019\u0131n izinden gidece\u011fi beklentisi i\u00e7indeydi. Fakat darbe, devrimci hareketin geli\u015fimine k\u0131sa zaman i\u00e7inde set \u00e7ekti. Kaddafi\u2019nin \u00e7evresindeki gen\u00e7 subaylar ba\u015fta petrol olmak \u00fczere, \u00fclkenin do\u011fal zenginliklerine dayanarak ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z bir ulus devlet ve modern bir toplum in\u015fa etme hevesindeydiler. Darbe liderleri \u00f6nce \u0130talyan m\u00fclkleri, sigorta \u015firketleri ve bankalar\u0131yla ba\u015flayan ard\u0131ndan Bat\u0131l\u0131 petrol \u015firketlerinin \u00e7o\u011funu da kapsam\u0131na alan bir kamula\u015ft\u0131rma program\u0131n\u0131 uygulamaya soktular. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Libya devrimi, o d\u00f6nemde geli\u015fmekte olan \u00fclkelere yay\u0131lan rejim de\u011fi\u015fikli\u011fi bi\u00e7iminin bir par\u00e7as\u0131n\u0131 olu\u015fturuyordu. Bu s\u00f6m\u00fcrge kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 m\u00fccadelelerin \u00f6zelliklerinden birisi, eksi d\u00fczen kendi iktidar\u0131n\u0131 daha fazla s\u00fcrd\u00fcrme imk\u00e2n\u0131n\u0131 yitirirken, genellikle zay\u0131f durumdaki i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n\u0131n iktidar\u0131 alma kapasitesinden yoksun olmas\u0131yd\u0131. Bu durum, kendini m\u00fccadelenin liderli\u011fine y\u00fckseltmesi i\u00e7in, yeni orta s\u0131n\u0131ftan gelen ba\u015fka bir g\u00fcce a\u00e7\u0131k kap\u0131 b\u0131rakt\u0131. \u00d6zg\u00fcr Subaylar devrimi geni\u015f kitleleri kapsam\u0131yordu; bunun yerine Libya ordusundan gelen k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck bir grubun etraf\u0131nda merkezile\u015fiyordu. Dirk Vanderwalle’ye g\u00f6re, \u201cbu \u00d6zg\u00fcr Subaylar\u0131n tamam\u0131 Askeri Akademi’ye kat\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131 \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc, monar\u015finin k\u0131s\u0131tlay\u0131c\u0131 politikalar\u0131 alt\u0131nda, \u00f6zel bir diploma gerektiren \u00fcniversite e\u011fitimini almaya hak kazanamam\u0131\u015flard\u0131\u201d.(7) <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00d6zg\u00fcr Subaylar kendilerini iktidara getiren devrimi, Arap Sosyalist Birli\u011fi (ASU) i\u00e7inde massetmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131. ASU, Nas\u0131r’\u0131n M\u0131s\u0131r’daki partisinden esinlenerek bir tek parti diktat\u00f6rl\u00fc\u011f\u00fc olu\u015fturuyordu. ASU tek resmi parti ilan edildi ve 1972’de grev hakk\u0131 yasad\u0131\u015f\u0131 ilan edildi, ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z sendikalar yasakland\u0131 ve \u00f6rg\u00fctl\u00fc muhalefete giri\u015fenlerin idam cezas\u0131yla yarg\u0131lanaca\u011f\u0131 ilan edildi.(8)<\/strong> \u00d6zg\u00fcr Subaylar\u0131n bir k\u0131sm\u0131 da d\u00e2hil olmak \u00fczere, darbeye kat\u0131lanlar\u0131n bir\u00e7o\u011fu, ASU’nun eylemlerini halk devrimine kar\u015f\u0131 bir ihanet olarak g\u00f6rd\u00fc. B\u00fcy\u00fcyen huzursuzluk, ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131\u011fa u\u011frayan bir darbe giri\u015fimini tetikleyen Devrimci Komuta Konseyi i\u00e7inde gerilimi art\u0131rd\u0131.(9)<\/strong> B\u00fcy\u00fcyen rahats\u0131zl\u0131ktan \u00fcrken Kaddafi, rejimi \u201cdevletsiz halk h\u00fck\u00fcmeti\u201d bi\u00e7iminde yeniden \u00f6rg\u00fctleyerek, ba\u015fka bir muhalefetin geli\u015fimini engellemeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131. ASU’yu tasfiye etti ve Ye\u015fil Kitab\u0131’nda a\u00e7\u0131klad\u0131\u011f\u0131, \u201csosyalizm\u201d, \u201cdemokrasi\u201d ve \u201c\u0130slam\u201d \u00fczerine yeni doktrinini ortaya koydu. Devletin fonksiyonlar\u0131n\u0131 devretti\u011fi \u201chalk komiteleri\u201dni (daha sonra Devrimci Komiteler ad\u0131 verildi) olu\u015fturdu. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Se\u00e7im yoluyla in\u015fa edilmemi\u015f bu komiteler, \u201cCemahiriye\u201d ad\u0131nda bi\u00e7imlenen yeni rejimin belkemi\u011fini olu\u015fturdu. Cemahiriye diye an\u0131lan bu sistem, halk\u0131n sistemi demokratik bir bi\u00e7imde denetledi\u011fi efsanesine dayan\u0131yordu. Komiteler t\u00fcm dergi ve televizyon istasyonlar\u0131n\u0131 ele ge\u00e7irdi, fabrikalar\u0131n, okullar\u0131n ve devlet dairelerinin y\u00f6netimlerini devrald\u0131. Fakat, devlet gelirlerinin y\u00fczde 99’unu olu\u015fturan petrol sanayii, yeni egemen kli\u011fin etraf\u0131ndaki k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u00e7eperin s\u0131k\u0131 denetimi alt\u0131nda kalacakt\u0131. Devrimci Komiteler retori\u011fi ve Ye\u015fil Kitap’ta ifade edilen felsefenin \u00f6rtt\u00fc\u011f\u00fc ger\u00e7ek ise, Kaddafi’ye sad\u0131k bir patronaj rejiminin yarat\u0131m\u0131yd\u0131. Kaddafi kendisini \u201ckarde\u015f lider\u201d ilan ederken, petrol gelirlerini geleneksel a\u015firet yap\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda bir destek taban\u0131 yaratmak i\u00e7in kulland\u0131 ve bunlar\u0131 halk\u0131n ger\u00e7ek bir demokratik denetiminden ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zla\u015ft\u0131rd\u0131.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1970’lerde petrol sekt\u00f6r\u00fcndeki h\u0131zl\u0131 y\u00fckseli\u015f, Libya’ya b\u00fcy\u00fck miktarlardaki nakit para ak\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131n, kalk\u0131nma program\u0131 fonlar\u0131n\u0131n ve ayn\u0131 zamanda yeni bir kamula\u015ft\u0131rma dalgas\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6n\u00fcn\u00fc a\u00e7t\u0131. Petro-dolarlar, rejimin egemenli\u011fini halk\u0131n belirli kesimleri aras\u0131nda peki\u015ftirmesini sa\u011flad\u0131. \u201cHalk denetimi\u201d slogan\u0131 alt\u0131nda ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirdi\u011fi \u0131l\u0131ml\u0131 kamula\u015ft\u0131rma program\u0131 d\u00e2hilinde Kaddafi, Trablus’ta yanm\u0131\u015f, haczedilmi\u015f en \u00f6nemli ta\u015f\u0131nmaz m\u00fclkleri kendi yak\u0131n \u00e7evresine da\u011f\u0131tt\u0131. Petrol gelirlerini, kom\u015fular\u0131 Tunus’ta al\u0131\u015fveri\u015f \u00e7\u0131lg\u0131nl\u0131\u011f\u0131na devem etmeleri i\u00e7in, d\u00fczenli olarak destek\u00e7ileriyle payla\u015f\u0131rd\u0131 (Tunuslular bu duruma \u201cYe\u015fil \u00e7ekirgelerin istilas\u0131\u201d ad\u0131n\u0131 vermi\u015flerdi)(10)<\/strong>. Fakat, politik pasiflikten imtina eden Libya halk\u0131, tepkisini rejimi \u00e7e\u015fitli bi\u00e7imlerde boykot ederek ortaya koydu. Devrimin ba\u015far\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131 kutlamak i\u00e7in d\u00fczenlenen \u201cYe\u015fil mitingler\u201de kat\u0131l\u0131m olduk\u00e7a s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131yd\u0131. Halk deste\u011fini g\u00f6steren b\u00fcy\u00fck g\u00f6steriler, yaln\u0131zca kat\u0131l\u0131m\u0131n zorunlu k\u0131l\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131 zamanlarda ger\u00e7ekle\u015febiliyordu. Bu c\u00fcretkar sessizlik hali, Kaddafi’nin s\u0131kl\u0131kla ger\u00e7ekle\u015fen eksantrik beyanlar\u0131na verilebilen tek cevapt\u0131. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Geli\u015fmi\u015f bir petrol altyap\u0131s\u0131na dayanan Libya ekonomisi ciddi bir b\u00fcy\u00fcme ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirdi, e\u011fitim ve di\u011fer sosyal alanlarda da ilerlemeler sa\u011fland\u0131. Fakat petrol gelirlerine a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 derecede ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131 olan ekonomi, petrol fiyatlar\u0131ndaki ani y\u00fckseli\u015f ve d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015flerin bas\u0131nc\u0131 alt\u0131ndayd\u0131. Y\u0131llar boyunca zenginli\u011fin giderek artmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen, Libyal\u0131lar\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00e7o\u011funlu\u011fu, gen\u00e7ler aras\u0131ndaki y\u00fcksek i\u015fsizlik oranlar\u0131 ve d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck \u00fccretlerle birlikte, zor ko\u015fullar alt\u0131nda ya\u015famaya devam etti.(11)<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anti-Emperyalizm, Pan-Arabizm ve Pan-Afrikanizm<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nas\u0131r 1970’te \u00f6ld\u00fc\u011f\u00fcnde, Kaddafi kendisini onun politik miras\u00e7\u0131s\u0131 ilan etti. Bu unvan, Arap direni\u015finin rehberi haline gelmek isteyen biri i\u00e7in uygun g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyordu. Kaddafi’nin ilan etmi\u015f oldu\u011fu \u201ckarde\u015f lider\u201d rol\u00fc, M\u0131s\u0131r’\u0131n yeni lideri Enver Sedat, M\u0131s\u0131r’\u0131n m\u00fcttefiki Sovyetler Birli\u011fi’ne s\u0131rt\u0131n\u0131 d\u00f6n\u00fcp ABD’yle anla\u015fmaya var\u0131nca, g\u00fc\u00e7 kazand\u0131. Sedat\u2019\u0131n anla\u015fmas\u0131na yan\u0131t olarak Kaddafi, Var\u015fova Pakt\u0131 i\u00e7erisinde bulunan \u00fclkeler ile bir dizi silah anla\u015fmas\u0131 yapt\u0131. Fakat, \u201csosyalizm\u201de dair estirilen b\u00fct\u00fcn o g\u00f6steri\u015fli havaya ra\u011fmen, ilk olarak kral taraf\u0131ndan anla\u015fma yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015f Bat\u0131l\u0131 k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck petrol \u015firketleri a\u011f\u0131 arac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131yla Avrupa’ya petrol tedarik etmeyi s\u00fcrd\u00fcrd\u00fc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bat\u0131-kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 direni\u015fin bir kalesi g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fcyle Libya’n\u0131n itibar\u0131n\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmek i\u00e7in, 70\u2019ler ve 80\u2019ler boyunca Kaddafi, Arap ulusalc\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00f6ylemini kulland\u0131. Ger\u00e7ekte ise, Libya’n\u0131n b\u00f6lgedeki direni\u015f hareketlerine m\u00fcdahil olmas\u0131 pek ho\u015f kar\u015f\u0131lanmad\u0131. Kaddafi’nin ajanlar\u0131, suikast\u00e7\u0131lar ve araba bombac\u0131lar\u0131 olarak \u00fcn kazanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Libya, \u0130srail’le ile olan m\u00fccadelelerinde Filistinlilere silah ve para yard\u0131m\u0131nda bulundu fakat, bu yard\u0131mlar\u0131n \u00e7o\u011fu, Filistin hareketinin geneli taraf\u0131ndan bilinmeyen \u00e7evrelere gidiyordu. Libya, Filistin lideri Yaser Arafat’in ziyaret etmeyi reddetti\u011fi tek Arap \u00fclkesiydi.(12)<\/strong> [Kaddafi’nin y\u00f6nlendirdi\u011fi \u00e7.] bu gruplar genellikle, Bat\u0131l\u0131 hedeflerin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra, Kaddafi’nin politikalar\u0131na muhalefet eden Filistinlilere ve L\u00fcbnanl\u0131lara sald\u0131r\u0131 d\u00fczenlemek i\u00e7in kullan\u0131ld\u0131. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bu m\u00fcdahale, pop\u00fcler ve sayg\u0131n L\u00fcbnanl\u0131 reformist \u015eii din adam\u0131 Musa El-Sadr\u2019\u0131n \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fclmesiyle doruk noktas\u0131na ula\u015ft\u0131. Sadr ve birka\u00e7 yolda\u015f\u0131, 1978’de g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fme i\u00e7in Trablus\u2019a \u00e7a\u011f\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015f ve k\u0131sa bir s\u00fcre sonra ortadan kaybolmu\u015ftu (Kimileri Sadr ve yolda\u015flar\u0131n\u0131n Kaddafi\u2019nin ofisinde \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fclm\u00fc\u015f oldu\u011funa inanmaktad\u0131r). Onlar\u0131n kaderi halen bilinmezli\u011fini koruyor, fakat \u0130mam’\u0131n ortadan kaybolmas\u0131 L\u00fcbnan direni\u015finde derin bir yara a\u00e7t\u0131. Sadr, sonradan Hizbullah’\u0131 kuracak olan, L\u00fcbnanl\u0131 \u015eii M\u00fcsl\u00fcmanlar\u0131n \u00e7o\u011funluk \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fc EMEL hareketinin lideriydi. Kaderin bir cilvesi olarak, L\u00fcbnan, 2011’in Ocak ay\u0131nda BM G\u00fcvenlik Konseyi’ne d\u00e2hil oldu\u011funda, Hizbullah’\u0131n L\u00fcbnan kabinesi \u00fczerindeki etkisi en y\u00fcksek seviyesine \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015f durumdayd\u0131. BM’deki L\u00fcbnan delegasyonu, Libya’ya uygulanan u\u00e7u\u015fa yasak b\u00f6lge karar\u0131n\u0131n al\u0131nmas\u0131nda \u00f6nemli bir ara\u00e7 haline geldi.(13)<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kaddafi’nin Filistin ve L\u00fcbnan direni\u015flerine m\u00fcdahalesinin feci sonu\u00e7lar\u0131 art\u0131k ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131 ve di\u011fer Arap rejimleri emperyalizmle bar\u0131\u015ft\u0131k\u00e7a, Kaddafi’nin Arap d\u00fcnyas\u0131ndaki n\u00fcfuzu yerle bir oldu. 1980’lerde, Pan-Afrikanizm’de yeni bir cevher ke\u015ffederek, dikkatini Afrika’ya y\u00f6neltti. Fakat bu yeni s\u00f6ylemin ard\u0131nda da, kaba bir ihtiras yat\u0131yordu: uranyum da d\u00e2hil olmak \u00fczere zengin maden kaynaklar\u0131na sahip olan \u00c7ad’\u0131n kuzeyini ele ge\u00e7irmek. Libya’n\u0131n \u00c7ad’daki sava\u015f\u0131, Libya destekli \u00c7ad birlikleri (ve Libya birlikleri) taraf\u0131ndan Frans\u0131z destekli \u00c7ad birliklerine kar\u015f\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilmi\u015fti. Kaddafi’nin \u00c7ad’daki \u00fcslerinin, Frans\u0131z destekli g\u00fc\u00e7ler taraf\u0131ndan istila edilmesiyle, bu sava\u015flar rejim i\u00e7in felaketle sonu\u00e7land\u0131.(14)<\/strong> Yenilgi rejim i\u00e7in fazlas\u0131yla k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fcc\u00fcyd\u00fc. Afrika maceras\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fc -bir ba\u015fka bask\u0131 dalgas\u0131yla kar\u015f\u0131lanacak olan- yeni bir muhalefet dalgas\u0131n\u0131n geli\u015fini m\u00fcjdeliyordu. Libya’n\u0131n emperyalizmle s\u00fcrt\u00fc\u015fmesi, Libya’n\u0131n artan bir bi\u00e7imde, uluslararas\u0131 alandan izolasyonuna neden oldu. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

ABD taraf\u0131ndan \u00f6nc\u00fcl\u00fck edilen yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar dizisiyle yeni yat\u0131r\u0131mlar durdu, petrol sanayii yedek par\u00e7a eksikli\u011fiyle durma noktas\u0131na geldi. 1986’da ABD Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Ronald Reagan, Trablus ve Bingazi’ye hava sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131 emri verdi ve bu sald\u0131r\u0131da Kaddafi’ye ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z bir suikast giri\u015fiminde bulunuldu. Bu sald\u0131r\u0131, ABD h\u00fck\u00fcmetinin \u201cVietnam sendromu\u201dnun \u00fcstesinden gelme giri\u015fiminde, \u00f6nemli bir k\u00f6\u015fe ta\u015f\u0131n\u0131 simgeliyordu. Cevap olarak Libya rejiminin 1988\u2019de bir Pan Am 103 yolcu u\u00e7a\u011f\u0131n\u0131 Lockerbie’de bombalad\u0131\u011f\u0131 iddia edildi. (15) <\/strong>Ne var ki, Irak’la ya\u015fanan \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar emperyalizmin \u00f6nceliklerini de\u011fi\u015ftirdi ve Lockerbie \u015f\u00fcphelilerinin teslim edilmesi i\u00e7in Kaddafi’yle anla\u015fmaya var\u0131ld\u0131 ve Bat\u0131’yla olan gerilim hafifledi. Kaddafi rejimi ger\u00e7ekte, Bat\u0131l\u0131 hedeflere d\u00f6n\u00fck operasyonlar\u0131n\u0131n hesab\u0131n\u0131, sald\u0131r\u0131 kurbanlar\u0131na verilen c\u00f6mert tazminatlarla \u00f6dedi. 1990’larda Kaddafi, \u00fclkesini yeni bir rotaya soktu. \u0130nfitah (A\u00e7\u0131l\u0131m) olarak bilinen yeni politika, Sedat’\u0131n 70’li y\u0131llardan M\u0131s\u0131r’da uygulamaya koydu\u011fu neoliberal politikalar\u0131 \u00f6rnek al\u0131yordu.(16) <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0130slamc\u0131 Muhalefet<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

90\u2019l\u0131 y\u0131llarda \u00fclkenin do\u011fusunda \u0130slamc\u0131lar\u0131n \u00f6nayak oldu\u011fu isyan, Bat\u0131 ile tam bir uzla\u015fman\u0131n kap\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7t\u0131. Bu modern \u0130slamc\u0131 ak\u0131m, 1980\u2019li y\u0131llarda Afganistan\u2019da sava\u015f veren Libyal\u0131 gruplar\u0131n i\u00e7inden \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. Bu gruplar \u00fclkeye d\u00f6nd\u00fc\u011f\u00fcne, Libya \u0130slami Sava\u015f Grubu (L\u0130SG)\u2019nu kurdu. Grup Afganistan direni\u015fi i\u00e7erisinde k\u00f6k salm\u0131\u015f olsa da, L\u0130SG \u201ck\u00fcresel cihat\u201d \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131s\u0131nda bulunmaktan uzak durmu\u015f ve kendisini Kaddafi diktat\u00f6rl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc y\u0131kmaya adam\u0131\u015ft\u0131.(17)<\/strong> \u0130slamc\u0131lar, Kaddafi\u2019yi neredeyse \u00f6ld\u00fcrecek iki suikast giri\u015fimi d\u00e2hil olmak \u00fczere, rejim g\u00fc\u00e7lerine kar\u015f\u0131 etkili sald\u0131r\u0131lar d\u00fczenledi. Bu isyan, 90’lar\u0131n ortas\u0131nda \u00fclkenin do\u011fusundaki ayaklanma giri\u015fimiyle doruk noktas\u0131na ula\u015ft\u0131 fakat, rejim hareketin kilit konumundaki liderlerinin bir b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc tutuklamay\u0131 ve \u00f6ld\u00fcrmeyi ba\u015fard\u0131. Sonu\u00e7ta hareket, kalesi olarak nitelenen b\u00f6lgelerden s\u00f6k\u00fcl\u00fcp at\u0131ld\u0131. Militanlar\u0131n bir\u00e7o\u011fu Sudan’a ka\u00e7arken, di\u011ferleri Irak’taki ABD i\u015fgaline kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadele eden direni\u015f hareketine kat\u0131ld\u0131. Nihayetinde, Seyf\u00fclislam Kaddafi ve etkili din adam\u0131 \u015eeyh Ali Sallabi -\u015fimdilerde devrimin liderlerinden ve ayaklanma i\u00e7in Katar deste\u011finin al\u0131nmas\u0131nda ba\u015fl\u0131ca arac\u0131lardan biri- aras\u0131nda yap\u0131lan anla\u015fman\u0131n bir par\u00e7as\u0131 olarak \u0130slamc\u0131lardan baz\u0131lar\u0131 serbest b\u0131rak\u0131ld\u0131.(18)<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

11 Eyl\u00fcl’\u00fc takiben, ABD L\u0130SG’i El-Kaide a\u011f\u0131n\u0131n bir par\u00e7as\u0131 olarak s\u0131n\u0131fland\u0131rd\u0131(19)<\/strong> \u2014 L\u0130SG’in \u015fiddetle reddetti\u011fi bir itham(20)<\/strong>. \u201cTer\u00f6re kar\u015f\u0131 sava\u015f\u201d, Kaddafi’ye Bat\u0131’yla nihai bar\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131 yapma f\u0131rsat\u0131 sunmaktayd\u0131. Kaddafi bu f\u0131rsat\u0131, 2004’te Tony Blair’la yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 gizli ve utan\u00e7 verici \u201c\u00e7\u00f6l g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmesi\u201d ile de\u011ferlendirdi. Bat\u0131l\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7ler i\u00e7in, Irak ve Afganistan’daki sava\u015flarda i\u015fler k\u00f6t\u00fc gitmeye ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, Kaddafi’nin rejimi, uzla\u015f\u0131lmas\u0131 gereken \u00fclkelerden bir haline geldi. \u00c7\u00f6ldeki g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fme, Irak i\u015fgalinin ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n bir kan\u0131t\u0131 olarak g\u00f6r\u00fcld\u00fc. Kaddafi rejimi ter\u00f6re kar\u015f\u0131 sava\u015fta art\u0131k Bat\u0131’yla i\u015fbirli\u011fi yap\u0131yordu.(21)<\/strong> Jamestown Kurulu\u015fu’nun Ter\u00f6rizm G\u00f6zlemcisi’ne g\u00f6re:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[11 Eyl\u00fcl] sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131ndan sadece haftalar sonra, bir CIA ekibi 1988 Lockerbie bombard\u0131man\u0131n\u0131 planlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fclen ki\u015fi (Libya istihbarat \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fcn\u00fcn lideri Musa Kusa) ile y\u00fcz y\u00fcze g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmek i\u00e7in Londra\u2019ya u\u00e7tu. Kusa CIA\u2019ya (ve ayr\u0131ca \u0130ngiltere MI6 d\u0131\u015f istihbarat servisine) L\u0130SG ajanlar\u0131n\u0131n isimleri ve Afganistan\u2019da e\u011fitim alm\u0131\u015f di\u011fer Libyal\u0131 \u0130slamc\u0131lar\u0131n isimlerinin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra \u0130ngiltere\u2019de ya\u015fayan L\u0130SG liderlerinin dosyalar\u0131n\u0131 da verdi. El-Kaide i\u00e7inde Libyal\u0131 Afganlar\u0131n merkezi rol\u00fc d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fcnde, istihbarat bilgilerinin ele ge\u00e7irilmesi a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan Bush y\u00f6netimi i\u00e7in bu, beklenmedik bir talih ku\u015fuydu. Amerikan h\u00fck\u00fcmeti, L\u0130SG’i resmi olarak ter\u00f6r \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fc ilan etti.(22) <\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

CIA ve Britanya’n\u0131n istihbarat \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fc MI6 L\u0130SG’in Libya’daki kilit \u00fcyelerini ka\u00e7\u0131rd\u0131lar ve tutuklad\u0131lar -bunlar aras\u0131nda \u015fu anda Trablus’taki silahl\u0131 isyanc\u0131lar\u0131n komutanlar\u0131ndan Abd\u00fcl Hakim Belhac da bulunuyordu. Bingazi ve Derma kentinin do\u011fu kesimi, \u0130slamc\u0131 hareketin kalbi olmay\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fcyor ve \u00f6zellikle ayaklanma s\u00fcrecinde silah depolar\u0131 ya\u011fmaland\u0131ktan sonra, Bat\u0131l\u0131 istihbarat \u00f6rg\u00fctleri aras\u0131nda derin endi\u015feler yaratmaya devam ediyor.(23)<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0130\u00e7i Bo\u015f Reformlar<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2004’te BM yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131n biti\u015fini takiben, Kaddafi o\u011flu Seyf\u00fclislam’\u0131n hamili\u011finde ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilecek reform vaatlerinde bulundu. Seyf\u00fclislam’\u0131n tedrici bir bi\u00e7imde ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilecek demokratikle\u015fme g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f\u00fc, Libya Bat\u0131’ya a\u00e7\u0131ld\u0131k\u00e7a, muazzam petrol gelirlerinin bir k\u0131sm\u0131n\u0131n hakiki de\u011fi\u015fiklikler yapmak i\u00e7in kullan\u0131labilece\u011fi beklentisini art\u0131rd\u0131. Rejim, de\u011fi\u015fim \u00fczerine yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 ucu-a\u00e7\u0131k fakat temelsiz konu\u015fmalarla bir\u00e7ok muhalifin sempatisini kazan\u0131rken, uygulad\u0131\u011f\u0131 bask\u0131y\u0131 da k\u0131smen hafifletti. Ger\u00e7ek iktidar ise, Kaddafi’nin etraf\u0131ndaki dar bir \u00e7evrenin kontrol\u00fcnde kalmaya devam etti. \u00d6zelle\u015ftirmeler ve neoliberal reformlar, 70’lerde kamula\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lan \u00f6nemli \u015firketleri sat\u0131n alan rejimin i\u015fbirlik\u00e7ileri i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli bir kazan\u00e7 kap\u0131s\u0131 haline geldi. Kaddafi, Ye\u015fil Kitap’\u0131n resmi ideolojisiyle tutarl\u0131 olabilmek i\u00e7in, neoliberal reform program\u0131n\u0131 \u201chalk denetiminin geni\u015flemesi\u201d olarak sundu.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Financial Times durumu \u015f\u00f6yle \u00f6zetliyordu: \u201cKaprisli liderin dramatik d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fcn yeni Bat\u0131l\u0131 dostlar\u0131ndan \u00e7ok kendisine kazan\u00e7 sa\u011flad\u0131\u011f\u0131, tart\u0131\u015fmaya a\u00e7\u0131k bir konu. 1988 Lockerbie bombalamas\u0131 i\u00e7in aranan iki ajan\u0131 teslim etmesi ve 2003’te kitle imha silahlar\u0131na sahip olmaktan vazge\u00e7ti\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131klamas\u0131ndan itibaren, Amerikal\u0131 ve Avrupal\u0131 petrol \u015firketleri, yeni s\u00f6zle\u015fmeler imzalamak i\u00e7in Trablus’a ak\u0131n etmi\u015f durumdalar. K\u00fcresel krizden muzdarip Bat\u0131l\u0131 finans kurumlar\u0131 da, Libya’n\u0131n yeni kurulmu\u015f ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z varl\u0131k fonu nezdinde zengin ve c\u00f6mert bir m\u00fc\u015fteri ke\u015ffetmi\u015f oldular.\u201d(24)<\/strong> BM yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131n kald\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131yla b\u00fcy\u00fck petrol \u015firketleri, adeta \u00e7\u0131ld\u0131rm\u0131\u015f bir \u015fekilde, y\u00fcz milyarlarca dolarl\u0131k yeni petrol s\u00f6zle\u015fmeleri, rafineri yenilemeleri, petrol arama anla\u015fmalar\u0131 yapmaya koyuldu.(25)<\/strong> Silah \u015firketleri de bu durumdan geri kalm\u0131\u015f de\u011fildi. Yaln\u0131zca 2009 y\u0131l\u0131nda, Frans\u0131z, \u0130talyan, Alman ve \u0130ngiliz \u015firketleri rejime \u00fc\u00e7 y\u00fcz milyon sterlin de\u011ferinde silah satm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Sat\u0131lan silahlar aras\u0131nda jet u\u00e7aklar\u0131, askeri te\u00e7hizatlar, cep telefonlar\u0131n\u0131n kapsama alan\u0131n\u0131 engelleyen elektronik ekipmanlar ve g\u00f6z ya\u015fart\u0131c\u0131 bombalar da vard\u0131.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Silah Ticaretine Kar\u015f\u0131 Kampanya (CAAT)’ya g\u00f6re, devrimin ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7 tarihi kabul edilen 17 \u015eubat’ta, \u201cfarkl\u0131 t\u00fcrden \u00e7e\u015fitli askeri te\u00e7hizatlar\u0131 b\u00f6lgedeki otoriter rejimlere satmas\u0131n\u0131n yan\u0131 s\u0131ra Britanya h\u00fck\u00fcmeti, Libya ve Bahreyn’e yap\u0131lan -g\u00f6z ya\u015fart\u0131c\u0131 bomba ile eylemleri bast\u0131rmak i\u00e7in kullan\u0131lan te\u00e7hizatlar ve keskin ni\u015fanc\u0131 t\u00fcfeklerini de kapsayan- mal ticaretini onaylad\u0131.\u201d Britanya h\u00fck\u00fcmeti, \u0130ngiliz silah \u015firketleri i\u00e7in \u201c\u00fcst-d\u00fczey politik m\u00fcdahaleler\u201d ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirdi\u011fi Libya’y\u0131 \u201cayr\u0131cal\u0131kl\u0131 bir pazar\u201d olarak g\u00f6r\u00fcyordu(26)<\/strong>. Bu i\u015fbirli\u011fi, Libya rejiminin Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n g\u00fcney k\u0131y\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n s\u0131n\u0131r polisli\u011fini yapmas\u0131na dayan\u0131yordu. \u0130talya’yla yap\u0131lan kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131kl\u0131 anla\u015fmalar, \u0130talya’ya giden Sahraalt\u0131 \u00fclkelerinden Afrikal\u0131 g\u00f6\u00e7menlerin derhal \u201cLibya’ya iadesini\u201d garanti alt\u0131na al\u0131yordu(27)<\/strong>. Bu anla\u015fmalar, rejimin 2000 y\u0131l\u0131nda Afrikal\u0131 siyah g\u00f6\u00e7menlere kar\u015f\u0131 vah\u015fi bir pogrom d\u00fczenledi\u011finin bilinmesine ra\u011fmen yap\u0131l\u0131yordu. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

17 \u015eubat Halk Ayaklanmas\u0131<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tunus ve M\u0131s\u0131r Devrimleri on y\u0131llar boyu bast\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015f olan \u00f6fke ve kinin a\u00e7\u0131\u011fa \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flad\u0131. Libya Devrimi’nin ba\u015flang\u0131c\u0131; Bingazi’de aralar\u0131nda sayg\u0131n avukatlar ve h\u00e2kimlerin de bulundu\u011fu kentin ileri gelen ki\u015filerinin, 17 \u015eubat g\u00fcn\u00fc i\u00e7in adliye binas\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6n\u00fcnde ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilecek bar\u0131\u015f\u00e7\u0131l eylem \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131s\u0131na, gen\u00e7 aktivistlerin gev\u015fek bir a\u011f\u0131n\u0131n d\u00e2hil olmas\u0131na dayan\u0131yor. Taleplerin s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131na ra\u011fmen bu g\u00f6steriler, bir nesil i\u00e7in, rejime kar\u015f\u0131 ilk kez a\u00e7\u0131k bir muhalefet sergileme imk\u00e2n\u0131 sa\u011fl\u0131yordu. Eylemciler, ayaklanmay\u0131 sezen polisin kendilerini p\u00fcsk\u00fcrtece\u011fini tahmin ederken, bir yandan da \u015fehir meydan\u0131na \u00e7ad\u0131r kurma giri\u015fiminde bulundular. Fakat polisin yerine rejimin silahl\u0131 \u00e7eteleri sahneye \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131 ve g\u00f6stericilere ate\u015f ederek, \u00e7ok say\u0131da bar\u0131\u015f\u00e7\u0131l aktivisti \u00f6ld\u00fcrd\u00fc. Bir sonraki sabah, \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fclen gen\u00e7lerin cenaze t\u00f6reni i\u00e7in b\u00fcy\u00fck bir kitle bir araya geldi. Kitle, g\u00fcvenlik binalar\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6n\u00fcnden ge\u00e7erken rejim destek\u00e7ileri tekrar ate\u015f a\u00e7t\u0131. Bir d\u00f6ng\u00fc halinde, insanlar \u00f6ld\u00fck\u00e7e cenaze t\u00f6renleri d\u00fczenleniyor ve bu s\u0131rada daha fazla insan \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fcl\u00fcyordu. Olaylar\u0131n ba\u015flamas\u0131n\u0131n ard\u0131ndan gelen ilk Cuma g\u00fcn\u00fc, protestolar \u00f6fke g\u00fcn\u00fcne d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. Kalabal\u0131k cenaze t\u00f6renleri, g\u00fcvenlik g\u00fc\u00e7lerinin silahs\u0131zland\u0131r\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve devlet g\u00fcvenlik binalar\u0131n\u0131n ate\u015fe verildi\u011fi, Bingazi’nin t\u00fcm\u00fcne yay\u0131lan kitlesel ve \u00f6fkeli eylemlere d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. Benzer sahneler \u00fclkenin d\u00f6rt bir yan\u0131nda tekrarland\u0131; Trablus’a yak\u0131n Zaviye kentinde \u00f6fkeli kalabal\u0131klar Kaddafi\u2019nin saraylar\u0131ndan birini ate\u015fe verdiler. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ertesi hafta protestolar ba\u015fkent Trablus\u2019a ve kuzey bat\u0131daki stratejik bir sanayi \u015fehri olan Misrata\u2019ya s\u0131\u00e7rad\u0131. Milyonlar\u0131n kat\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 eylemlilikler, rejimi ku\u015fatmaya ba\u015flad\u0131. Libyal\u0131 diplomatlar g\u00f6revlerinden istifa edip bulunduklar\u0131 \u00fclkelere iltica ediyor, bir\u00e7ok subay gelen emirlerin uygulanmamas\u0131 do\u011frultusunda \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131lar yap\u0131yor, bir\u00e7ok kent ve kasaba devrimin yan\u0131nda oldu\u011funu ilan ediyor ve petrol sekt\u00f6r\u00fcndeki i\u015f\u00e7iler greve \u00e7\u0131k\u0131yordu. Tunus ve M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019da hayret verici zaferler yaratan s\u00fcre\u00e7, burada da i\u015fba\u015f\u0131ndayd\u0131: K\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck g\u00f6steriler kitlesel eylemlere d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fm\u00fc\u015f ve g\u00fcvenlik g\u00fc\u00e7leri sokaklardan silinmi\u015fken, ordu birimleri taraf de\u011fi\u015ftiriyor ve en \u00f6nemlisi, kitlesel grev dalgalar\u0131 rejimin kaderini tayin ediyordu. Kaddafi\u2019nin o\u011flu Seyf\u00fclislam ise devlet televizyonuna \u00e7\u0131karak, \u015fiddetten \u00f6t\u00fcr\u00fc \u201cuyu\u015fturucu ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131s\u0131 ve kahve m\u00fcptelas\u0131 Araplar\u0131, g\u00f6\u00e7menleri ve di\u011fer yabanc\u0131lar\u0131\u201d su\u00e7layan, tutars\u0131z, ipe sapa gelmez bir konu\u015fma yapt\u0131(28)<\/strong>. Konu\u015fmas\u0131 bitti\u011finde, Trablus’taki televizyon kanal\u0131 \u00f6fkeli kalabal\u0131klar taraf\u0131ndan bask\u0131na u\u011frad\u0131. Kaddafi’nin ka\u00e7m\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu s\u00f6ylentileri aras\u0131nda, \u015fehrin merkezindeki Ye\u015fil Meydan, zafer sarho\u015fu kitlelerin ak\u0131n\u0131na u\u011frad\u0131. Fakat, asl\u0131nda tuza\u011fa d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fclm\u00fc\u015flerdi. Silahl\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7leri ve destek\u00e7ileriyle Kaddafi ba\u015fkenti istila etti. Trabus’taki ayaklanma yenilgiye u\u011fram\u0131\u015ft\u0131(29)<\/strong>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

UGK\u2019n\u0131n Kurulu\u015fu<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ulusal Ge\u00e7i\u015f Konseyi (UGK) Bingazi\u2019de devrimin do\u011fum yerinde kuruldu. Konsey ilk olarak ayaklanman\u0131n liderlerinden, g\u00fcvenilir yarg\u0131\u00e7 ve tan\u0131nm\u0131\u015f simalardan, isyanc\u0131 ordu birliklerinin komutanlar\u0131ndan ve isyanc\u0131 kabilelerin temsilcilerinden olu\u015fuyordu(30)<\/strong>. Konsey, do\u011fu kentinde meydana gelen ayaklanman\u0131n acil ihtiya\u00e7lar\u0131ndan do\u011fdu. Rejim g\u00fc\u00e7lerinin \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fc takiben, hapishaneler, ordu, polis, mahkemeler ve M\u0131s\u0131r’la olan s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131n denetimi de d\u00e2hil olmak \u00fczere, devletin y\u00f6netim organlar\u0131n\u0131 ve\/veya i\u015flevlerini halk denetimi alt\u0131nda idare eder hale geldiler. Yiyece\u011fin ve paran\u0131n da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 Konsey \u00f6rg\u00fctlemeye ba\u015flad\u0131 ve i\u015flerinden at\u0131lan, yokluk i\u00e7indeki binlerce g\u00f6\u00e7men i\u015f\u00e7inin ko\u015fullar\u0131n\u0131n iyile\u015ftirilmesiyle ilgilendi. Bir televizyon ve radyo istasyonu kurdu ve ilk devrimci gazetenin yay\u0131m\u0131na ba\u015flad\u0131. \u0130\u015f\u00e7i ve y\u00f6netici komiteleri, elektrik istasyonlar\u0131, liman ve havaliman\u0131 gibi kilit \u00f6nemdeki yerlerin y\u00f6netimini devrald\u0131. Bat\u0131l\u0131 gazetecilerin de d\u00e2hil oldu\u011fu pek \u00e7ok g\u00f6zlemci, konseylerin g\u00fcc\u00fcnden ve verimli\u011finden, \u015fehirdeki \u201c\u00f6zg\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u201d rahatlat\u0131c\u0131 havas\u0131ndan bahsetmekteydi. Bingazi’de yiyecek k\u0131tl\u0131\u011f\u0131na ra\u011fmen, en yoksul vatanda\u015flar, devrimden \u00f6ncesine oranla \u00e7ok daha iyi beslendiklerini s\u00f6ylemekteydiler.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

UGK, do\u011fudaki \u015fehirlerin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra Misrata, Bat\u0131 Da\u011flar\u0131 ve Trablus’un bat\u0131s\u0131ndaki \u015fehirler de d\u00e2hil olmak \u00fczere, kurtar\u0131lm\u0131\u015f b\u00f6lgelerde ortaya \u00e7\u0131kan benzer yap\u0131larla ba\u011flant\u0131lar kurdu. Yaln\u0131zca bir g\u00fcnde, sekiz kent bu komiteleri kuruyor ve devrimden yana oldu\u011funu ilan ediyordu. UGK’nin yap\u0131lanma \u015fekli, t\u00fcm \u00fclke \u00e7ap\u0131nda, halk denetimi alt\u0131nda devrimin geni\u015fletilip yay\u0131labilmesine olanak sa\u011fl\u0131yordu. Fakat UGK, yepyeni bir geli\u015fmeyle kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya kald\u0131. Ayaklanman\u0131n ilk g\u00fcnlerinde h\u00fck\u00fcmetten istifa eden eski adalet bakan\u0131 Mustafa Abd\u00fcl Celil, Bingazi’de ortaya \u00e7\u0131karak kendisini \u201cGe\u00e7ici H\u00fck\u00fcmet\u201din lideri ilan etti. Onun arkas\u0131nda ise, eski diplomatlar ve ayaklanman\u0131n desteklenmesi i\u00e7in ABD ve Avrupa’yla uzla\u015fma arayan kesimler toplanmaktayd\u0131. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Celil’in deklarasyonundan hemen sonra, ge\u00e7ici h\u00fck\u00fcmetin hi\u00e7bir me\u015fruiyeti olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klamas\u0131 yapan UGK, Celil’in tutumuna \u015fiddetli bir tepki g\u00f6stermi\u015fti. Konsey, rejimin mal varl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131n dondurulmas\u0131 ve paral\u0131 askerlerin \u00fclkeye getirilmesinin engellenmesinin \u00f6tesine ge\u00e7en her t\u00fcrl\u00fc d\u0131\u015f askeri m\u00fcdahaleyi reddetti. Konsey Bat\u0131’n\u0131n, eski rejimden geriye kalanlar\u0131n tecrit edilmesine yard\u0131m maskesi alt\u0131nda, devrimi yapan kitlelerin arkas\u0131ndan bir anla\u015fmaya giri\u015fmesinden korkuyordu. Bingazi’de bulundan UGK, 28 \u015eubat’ta, \u00fclkeye herhangi bir d\u0131\u015f m\u00fcdahale istemedi\u011fini net bir bi\u00e7imde ortaya koydu(31)<\/strong>. Devrimcilerin askeri stratejisi yabanc\u0131 askerleri veya Bat\u0131l\u0131 sava\u015f u\u00e7aklar\u0131n\u0131 yard\u0131ma \u00e7a\u011f\u0131rmak de\u011fil; onlar\u0131 ezmek i\u00e7in g\u00f6nderilen kuvvetleri, taraf de\u011fi\u015ftirmeye ikna etmekti. Bu strateji, zorunlu askerli\u011fini yapan kesimler \u00fczerinde \u00e7o\u011fu kez ba\u015far\u0131ya ula\u015fm\u0131\u015f olsa da, rejimin silahl\u0131 kuvvetlerini olu\u015fturan as\u0131l kesimler, Kaddafi’nin o\u011fullar\u0131n\u0131n komutas\u0131ndaki iyi silahlanm\u0131\u015f m\u00fcfrezelerle kald\u0131.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kaddafi\u2019nin Kar\u015f\u0131devrimi<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Seferberli\u011fin kapsay\u0131c\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131na ra\u011fmen, Kaddafi rejimi halen g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir destek taban\u0131na sahipti. Halen destek\u00e7ilerini seferber edebiliyor, onlara silah da\u011f\u0131tabiliyor ve ordu ve g\u00fcvenlik g\u00fc\u00e7lerinde tasfiye operasyonlar\u0131na giri\u015febiliyordu. Sivil idarenin kilit isimlerinin yans\u0131ra, y\u00fczlerce asker ve subay idam edildi. Binlerce sivil tutukland\u0131 veya \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fcld\u00fc. Kaddafi\u2019nin kar\u015f\u0131devrimi, rejimin kaba kuvvet kullanarak ayakta kalabilece\u011fi fikri \u00fczerine kuruluydu. Bu vah\u015fi sald\u0131r\u0131, bar\u0131\u015f\u00e7\u0131l hareketi silahl\u0131 bir ayaklanmaya d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fmeye zorlad\u0131. Bu e\u015fitsiz bir sava\u015ft\u0131. Kar\u015f\u0131 sald\u0131r\u0131n\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fckl\u00fc\u011f\u00fc, devrimin, askeri \u00f6rg\u00fctlenmenin en temel unsurlar\u0131n\u0131 tamamlamas\u0131 i\u00e7in dahi ihtiya\u00e7 duydu\u011fu zaman\u0131 dramatik bir bi\u00e7imde k\u0131saltm\u0131\u015ft\u0131.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ayaklanma halindeki 15 g\u00fcn\u00fcn ard\u0131ndan, devrim art\u0131k var olma sava\u015f\u0131 veriyordu. Devrimcilerin birinci \u00f6nceli\u011fi, do\u011fudaki kurtar\u0131lm\u0131\u015f b\u00f6lgelerle bat\u0131da, ku\u015fatma alt\u0131ndaki \u015fehir ve kasabalar aras\u0131ndaki ba\u011flant\u0131y\u0131 kurmakt\u0131. Devrimciler i\u00e7in olduk\u00e7a \u00e7etrefilli bir zamand\u0131. Ayaklanman\u0131n ilk g\u00fcnlerinde, rejim g\u00fc\u00e7lerine kar\u015f\u0131 imk\u00e2ns\u0131z bir zaferin inanc\u0131yla silahlanan ve ate\u015f eden do\u011fulu gen\u00e7lik, bat\u0131ya do\u011fru taarruza giri\u015fti. K\u00f6t\u00fc silahlanm\u0131\u015f ve olduk\u00e7a s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 bir askeri e\u011fitim alm\u0131\u015f halde, Kaddafi’nin kalesi konumundaki Sirte \u015fehrinin d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda tuza\u011fa d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcler. Devrim art\u0131k yaln\u0131zca \u00fclkenin bat\u0131s\u0131nda de\u011fil, kurtar\u0131lm\u0131\u015f do\u011fusunda da tehlikedeydi. Rejim \u00fclkenin kilit otoyollar\u0131n\u0131n kontrol\u00fcn\u00fc ele ald\u0131 ve k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck ama iyi silahlanm\u0131\u015f birliklerini, bir \u015fehirden di\u011ferine ilerletebildi. Bingazi’ye do\u011fru b\u00fcy\u00fck geri \u00e7ekili\u015f ba\u015flad\u0131. Kaddafi’nin birlikleri isyanc\u0131 \u015fehri ku\u015fatt\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, Kaddafi, \u201cOnlara kar\u015f\u0131 merhamet g\u00f6stermeyece\u011fiz\u201d, a\u00e7\u0131klamas\u0131nda bulundu(32)<\/strong>. Bat\u0131 Da\u011flar\u0131’nda ve Misrata’da isyanc\u0131lar rejimin sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 p\u00fcsk\u00fcrtmeyi ba\u015fard\u0131lar fakat, bunun i\u00e7in \u00f6dedikleri bedel \u00e7ok y\u00fcksekti. Bingazi, rejimin temel hedefi olarak kalmaya devam etti. Kaddafi, \u015fehrin d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcn ayaklanma i\u00e7in par\u00e7alay\u0131c\u0131 bir yenilgi olabilece\u011fi ihtimaline oynuyordu.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tunus ve M\u0131s\u0131r devrimleri, Libya’daki olaylar\u0131n gerisinde kalm\u0131\u015f durumdayd\u0131. Libya Devrimi’nin hayatta kalabilmesi i\u00e7in, kom\u015fular\u0131n\u0131n acil pratik deste\u011fine ihtiyac\u0131 vard\u0131. K\u0131s\u0131tl\u0131 miktarda yard\u0131m ve silah, Tunus ve M\u0131s\u0131r’dan gelebildi fakat, devrimcilerin gelen yard\u0131mlar\u0131 da\u011f\u0131tma kapasiteleri de olduk\u00e7a s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131yd\u0131. Mevcut eksiklikler Bat\u0131 m\u00fcdahalesine kap\u0131y\u0131 a\u00e7t\u0131. Devrimin ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 olabilece\u011fine ikna olan Bat\u0131l\u0131 liderler, isyana destek olmak \u00fczere manevra yapt\u0131lar. Etraflar\u0131 sar\u0131lm\u0131\u015f durumdaki devrimciler, Bat\u0131’n\u0131n insaf\u0131na s\u0131\u011f\u0131nmaktan ba\u015fka bir \u00e7areleri olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 hissettiler. UGK’n\u0131n d\u0131\u015f m\u00fcdahaleye kar\u015f\u0131 olan tutumuna ra\u011fmen, Kaddafi’nin sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 durdurabilmek i\u00e7in, Konsey \u00f6nce uluslararas\u0131 yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar ve hava sahas\u0131n\u0131n kapat\u0131lmas\u0131 ve ard\u0131ndan hava sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131 \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131s\u0131 yapmaya zorland\u0131(33)<\/strong>. Askeri yenilgiler UGK’y\u0131, devrimi Bat\u0131’n\u0131n \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131na ipotek etmeye zorlad\u0131. Mustafa Abd\u00fcl Celil art\u0131k UGK’n\u0131n yeni lideriydi ve komitelerin yap\u0131lar\u0131 de\u011fi\u015fmeye ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Gasp Edilmi\u015f Devrim<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pek \u00e7ok Libyal\u0131, zaferlerini korudu\u011fu i\u00e7in Bat\u0131’y\u0131 \u00f6vmektedir. Oysa, ABD, Fransa ve Britanya’n\u0131n eylemlerinde c\u00f6mertlikten, fedakarl\u0131ktan bahsetmek, pek m\u00fcmk\u00fcn de\u011fildir. Bu ayn\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7ler, devrimin ger\u00e7ek anlamda ba\u015far\u0131ya ula\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 imk\u00e2ns\u0131z hale getirmi\u015flerdi. Ayaklanman\u0131n ilk g\u00fcnlerinde UGK bir acil talepler listesi haz\u0131rlam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. \u0130syanc\u0131lar uluslararas\u0131 tan\u0131nma ve silah ve di\u011fer ihtiya\u00e7lar\u0131n tedarik edilmesi i\u00e7in, rejimin el koyulan milyarlarca dolarl\u0131k fonlar\u0131na eri\u015fim hakk\u0131 talep etmi\u015flerdi. Bat\u0131 ise \u201ch\u00fck\u00fcmetleri\u201d de\u011fil, yaln\u0131zca \u00fclkeleri tan\u0131d\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ilan etmi\u015f, Kaddafi’nin \u00fclkeye paral\u0131 asker getirmesini sa\u011flayan u\u00e7u\u015flar\u0131 engellemeyi reddetmi\u015f, \u201cter\u00f6ristlerin\u201d eline ge\u00e7ebilece\u011fi korkusuyla, silah yard\u0131m\u0131nda bulunmaya kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015flard\u0131(34)<\/strong>. Son olarak da, el koyulan fonlar\u0131n \u201cyasal zeminlerde\u201d kullan\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 reddettiler(35)<\/strong>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bunun yerine Bat\u0131l\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7ler UGK’n\u0131n \u00f6n\u00fcne birtak\u0131m ko\u015fullar koydular. \u0130leride kurulacak herhangi bir Libya h\u00fck\u00fcmetinin, Kaddafi d\u00f6neminde imzalanm\u0131\u015f b\u00fct\u00fcn s\u00f6zle\u015fmeleri aynen kabul etmesini talep ettiler. Libya \u0130stikrar Tak\u0131m\u0131 Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Ahmed Cehani, A\u011fustos 2011’de bu vaadi defalarca tekrarlad\u0131. Bir bas\u0131n toplant\u0131s\u0131nda belirtti\u011fi \u00fczere, \u201cPetrol sekt\u00f6r\u00fcndeki s\u00f6zle\u015fmeler dokunulmazd\u0131r… Herhangi bir s\u00f6zle\u015fmenin iptali s\u00f6z konusu de\u011fildir.\u201d(36)<\/strong> Yeni kurulacak Libya h\u00fck\u00fcmeti, aralar\u0131nda Sahraalt\u0131 \u00fclkelerinden G\u00fcney Avrupa’ya y\u00f6nelik g\u00f6\u00e7\u00fc durdurmak \u00fczere \u0130talya’yla yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015f ikili s\u00f6zle\u015fme de olmak \u00fczere, b\u00fct\u00fcn \u201culuslararas\u0131 s\u00f6zle\u015fmelere\u201d sayg\u0131 duymak zorundayd\u0131. Konsey ayr\u0131ca, yay\u0131nlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir bildiride, \u201cter\u00f6rizme kar\u015f\u0131\u201d verilmi\u015f olan taahh\u00fctlere de sad\u0131k kalaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 vurgulad\u0131(37)<\/strong>. Yeni Libya t\u0131pk\u0131 eski Libya gibi olmal\u0131yd\u0131, tek fark Kaddafi ve rejimin \u00f6nemli isimlerinin devre d\u0131\u015f\u0131 kalacak olmas\u0131yd\u0131. Bu, UGK’n\u0131n reddedemeyece\u011fi bir teklifti. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0130\u00e7 Sava\u015f ve \u0130kinci Ayaklanma<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

NATO’nun hava sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n etkisi fazla abart\u0131lmamal\u0131d\u0131r. Sava\u015f u\u00e7aklar\u0131 rejim g\u00fc\u00e7lerini p\u00fcsk\u00fcrtt\u00fc fakat, kesin sonucun belirlenece\u011fi yer, karadaki sava\u015ft\u0131. Sava\u015f\u0131n esas y\u00fck\u00fc silahl\u0131 milislere devredilmi\u015fti ve do\u011fuda isyanc\u0131lar\u0131n h\u00fccumu bir petrol liman\u0131 olan Brega’da duraklay\u0131nca, sava\u015f\u0131n a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131k noktas\u0131 Misrata ve Bat\u0131 Da\u011flar\u0131’na kayd\u0131. Bat\u0131 Da\u011flar\u0131, Kaddafi rejimi alt\u0131nda uzunca bir zamand\u0131r bask\u0131 alt\u0131ndaki Berberi az\u0131nl\u0131\u011f\u0131n yurduydu. \u0130syanc\u0131lar\u0131n Kaddafi’nin cephesini yar\u0131p ilerlemeleri, yaz d\u00f6neminde, Bat\u0131 Da\u011flar\u0131’ndaki Berberi isyanc\u0131lar\u0131n Tunus’la olan s\u0131n\u0131r b\u00f6lgesinin kontrol\u00fcn\u00fc ele ge\u00e7irmeleriyle m\u00fcmk\u00fcn oldu. Trablus ve di\u011fer bat\u0131 \u015fehirlerindeki bask\u0131dan ka\u00e7m\u0131\u015f olan binlerce Libyal\u0131, sava\u015fa kat\u0131lmak i\u00e7in ak\u0131n etti. \u00d6nemli say\u0131daki e\u011fitmen ve Katar’dan gelen \u00f6zel birlikleri de kapsayan d\u0131\u015f yard\u0131m sayesinde isyanc\u0131lar daha \u00f6rg\u00fctl\u00fc ve etkili hale gelmi\u015flerdi. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

En kanl\u0131 sava\u015flar Misrata\u2019n\u0131n kontrol\u00fc i\u00e7in verildi. Bu sanayi \u015fehri, ba\u015fkent ile rejimin kalesi konumundaki Sirte aras\u0131ndaki stratejik sahil yolu \u00fczerine yer al\u0131yordu. Bingazi’den farkl\u0131 olarak Misrata, modern \u00e7elik fabrikalar\u0131nda \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir sanayi proletaryas\u0131na sahipti. Misrata’n\u0131n savunucular\u0131; do\u011fudan silah ve di\u011fer ihtiya\u00e7 \u00fcr\u00fcnleri temin ettikleri ya\u015famsal \u00f6nemdeki deniz yolu, Libya donanmas\u0131n\u0131n ve silah ambargosunu dayatan NATO sava\u015f gemilerinin ablukas\u0131 alt\u0131ndayken, fabrikalar\u0131 z\u0131rhl\u0131 ara\u00e7lar \u00fcretme ko\u015fullar\u0131na uyarlayarak, ablukadan kurnazca s\u0131yr\u0131lm\u0131\u015flard\u0131(38)<\/strong>. \u0130syanc\u0131lar esas\u0131nda, NATO hava sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6ncesinde rejim g\u00fc\u00e7lerini ku\u015fatm\u0131\u015f ve yenilgiye u\u011fratm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Zafer Misrata’daki \u00f6nderli\u011fe isyanc\u0131lar aras\u0131nda b\u00fcy\u00fck bir etki kazand\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131 ve Misrata’daki \u00f6nderli\u011fin Bingazi’deki UGK’ye kar\u015f\u0131 ele\u015ftirel bir tutumu vard\u0131. UGK’nin Bat\u0131 destekli liderli\u011fini reddettiler ve rejimin eski simalar\u0131n\u0131 saflar\u0131ndan temizlemelerini talep ettiler. \u015eehir Bingazi’den do\u011frudan emirler almay\u0131 reddetti ve Kaddafi’nin d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fc takiben, Trablus’taki yeni h\u00fck\u00fcmetten yar\u0131-ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z konumunu s\u00fcrd\u00fcrebilece\u011fini ilan etti.(39)<\/strong> \u0130\u00e7 sava\u015ftaki rollerine ra\u011fmen Misrata g\u00fc\u00e7leri, rejim kuvvetlerine kar\u015f\u0131 sald\u0131r\u0131ya ge\u00e7mek i\u00e7in hala NATO hava g\u00fcc\u00fcne bel ba\u011fl\u0131yordu. Ba\u015fkentin d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcn ard\u0131ndan Misrata, siyah Afrikal\u0131lar\u0131 hedef almakla k\u00f6t\u00fc bir \u00fcn kazand\u0131 ve rejimin destek\u00e7isi olmakla su\u00e7land\u0131.(40) <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

20 A\u011fustos’ta Trablus tekrar ayakland\u0131. Bu sefer isyanc\u0131lar \u015fehrin i\u00e7ine girmi\u015flerdi. Reuters haber ajans\u0131na g\u00f6re, \u015fehrin denetimi i\u00e7in verilen sava\u015fta \u00f6zel yabanc\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7ler kilit bir rol oynam\u0131\u015flard\u0131: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0130syanc\u0131lar yaln\u0131z de\u011fildi. ABD ve m\u00fcttefiklerin kaynaklar\u0131na g\u00f6re, \u0130ngiliz casuslar Trablus\u2019a s\u0131zd\u0131 ve hava sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131na yard\u0131mc\u0131 olmak ve sivillerin \u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc engellemek i\u00e7in radyo cihazlar\u0131 kurdular. Frans\u0131zlar yeni silahlar\u0131n kullan\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6\u011frenilmesi ve ta\u015f\u0131nmas\u0131nda yard\u0131mc\u0131 oldular. Washington kritik bir son a\u015famada, Trablus semalar\u0131na iki insans\u0131z hava u\u00e7a\u011f\u0131 daha g\u00f6nderdi ve NATO’nun sald\u0131r\u0131 kapasitesini art\u0131rarak yard\u0131mda bulundu. Bat\u0131l\u0131 yetkililerle isyan\u0131n resmi liderleri, Birle\u015fik Arap Emirlikleri ve Katar gibi Arap devletlerinin \u00f6rt\u00fcl\u00fc deste\u011finin de ya\u015famsal \u00f6nemde oldu\u011funu belirtiyorlar. Doha [Katar’\u0131n ba\u015fkenti \u00e7.] isyanc\u0131lara silah, para ve askeri e\u011fitim verdi.(41) <\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fakat son sava\u015ftaki kilit unsur kitlelerin rol\u00fcyd\u00fc. Bir UGK yetkilisi, son sald\u0131r\u0131 tarihinin ba\u015fkentteki direni\u015f taraf\u0131ndan belirlendi\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131klad\u0131: \u201cTrablus’ta ayaklanman\u0131n, camilerden \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131 yap\u0131larak o g\u00fcn ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilece\u011fine dair halk\u0131n haz\u0131rlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir plan vard\u0131. Bu askeri ya da resmi bir plan de\u011fildi; bu halk\u0131n plan\u0131yd\u0131. Trablus’taki halk, bunu bizimle e\u015fg\u00fcd\u00fcm halinde ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirdi.\u201d(42)<\/strong> Kente do\u011fru yaln\u0131zca birka\u00e7 y\u00fcz isyanc\u0131 ilerlerken ba\u015fkentin ele ge\u00e7irilmesinde belirleyici olan, kitlelerin yeniden sahneye \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131yd\u0131. Kalabal\u0131klar Ye\u015fil Meydan’da birle\u015fti, mahallelerde barikatlar kurdu ve art\u0131k demoralize olmu\u015f rejim g\u00fc\u00e7lerinin silahlar\u0131na el koydu. Rejimin geriye kalan son unsurlar\u0131n\u0131n da ma\u011flup edilmesi, art\u0131k bir an meselesiydi. 20 Ekim’de Kaddafi ve rejimin di\u011fer kilit isimleri yakaland\u0131 ve infaz edildi. Kaddafi’nin \u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fc, onun ad\u0131na sava\u015fan g\u00fc\u00e7lerin nihai \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fc simgeliyordu. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0130nsani Sava\u015f ve \u201cYumu\u015fak Askeri G\u00fc\u00e7\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bat\u0131’n\u0131n Libya’ya m\u00fcdahalesinin \u00f6nemli bir amac\u0131 vard\u0131: \u201cinsani m\u00fcdahale\u201d ve onun daha modern bi\u00e7imleri olan \u201cyumu\u015fak askeri g\u00fc\u00e7\u201d ve \u201cadaleli liberalizm\u201de (muscular liberalism)(43) <\/strong>prestijini yeniden kazand\u0131rmak. Bu doktrin ilk olarak 1990’lardaki Balkan Sava\u015flar\u0131’nda, Srebrenitsa’da Bosnal\u0131lara y\u00f6nelik korkun\u00e7 katliam\u0131n durdurulamay\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131 takiben, Bat\u0131 m\u00fcdahalesini me\u015frula\u015ft\u0131rmak i\u00e7in geli\u015ftirildi. Ve daha sonraki Afganistan ve Irak i\u015fgallerinin ideolojik me\u015frula\u015ft\u0131rma arac\u0131 haline geldi. \u0130nsani m\u00fcdahalenin dayana\u011f\u0131, liberal insani de\u011ferlerin hayata ge\u00e7irilmesinin Bat\u0131’n\u0131n \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131yla \u00f6rt\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc\u011f\u00fc efsanesine dayan\u0131yordu. Sol kesimler aras\u0131nda da etkili olan bu fikir, Bat\u0131’n\u0131n askeri i\u015fgallerine kitle deste\u011fi sa\u011fl\u0131yordu. Fakat, Irak ve Afganistan’daki y\u0131k\u0131mlarla ger\u00e7ek amac\u0131 ortaya \u00e7\u0131kan insani sava\u015f s\u00f6ylemi i\u00e7in, Libya Devrimi’nin patlak vermesi onun yeniden canland\u0131r\u0131labilmesi i\u00e7in bir f\u0131rsat yaratt\u0131. \u00d6te yandan, isyanc\u0131lar\u0131n bizzat kendilerinden yard\u0131m \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131s\u0131 gelmesi, Arap Birli\u011fi’nin deste\u011fini almas\u0131 ve L\u00fcbnan Hizbullah\u0131 gibi anti-emperyalist hareketlerin \u00f6rt\u00fcl\u00fc deste\u011fi gibi etkenler, bu m\u00fcdahaleyi Irak ve Afganistan sava\u015flar\u0131ndan farkl\u0131la\u015ft\u0131r\u0131yordu. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Daniel Serwer bu konuyu ele almakta olduk\u00e7a h\u0131zl\u0131 davrand\u0131. Etkili bir Amerikan dergisi olan Atlantic’te \u015f\u00f6yle yazd\u0131, \u201cg\u00f6n\u00fcll\u00fcler koalisyonu bir Arap \u00fclkesine sald\u0131r\u0131yor. Frans\u0131z sava\u015f u\u00e7aklar\u0131 z\u0131rhl\u0131 askeri ara\u00e7lar\u0131 vuruyor. Amerikan cruise f\u00fczeleri hava savunma te\u00e7hizatlar\u0131n\u0131 imha ediyor. B\u00fct\u00fcn bu olanlar fazlas\u0131yla, Irak’ta ya\u015fananlar\u0131 \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131\u015ft\u0131r\u0131yor. Ama asl\u0131nda Libya \u00f6rne\u011fi, Irak’tan ziyade Srebrenitsa \u00f6rne\u011fiyle benze\u015fiyor. Uluslararas\u0131 topluluk uluslararas\u0131 yasalar alt\u0131nda, kitlesel katliamlar\u0131 \u00f6nlemek i\u00e7in hareket ediyor.\u201d(44)<\/strong> Serwer’in c\u00fcmleleri o d\u00f6nemdeki h\u00e2kim hissiyat\u0131 yans\u0131t\u0131yordu. Fakat bu ayn\u0131 zamanda bir risk de bar\u0131nd\u0131r\u0131yordu. Amerikan strateji dergisi Stratfor, biraz ironik bir bi\u00e7imde \u015f\u00f6yle bir not d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcyordu:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Avrupa’da \u201cyumu\u015fak g\u00fc\u00e7\u201d doktrini, merkezi bir doktrin haline geldi. Libya olay\u0131nda ise yumu\u015fak g\u00fc\u00e7ten bahsetmek bir hayli zor. Yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar ve verilen sert deme\u00e7ler Kaddafi’yi durduracak gibi g\u00f6r\u00fcnm\u00fcyor, askeri harek\u00e2t ise yumu\u015fak g\u00fc\u00e7 anlay\u0131\u015f\u0131na ayk\u0131r\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcyor. \u0130\u015fte bu ko\u015fullar, yumu\u015fak askeri g\u00fc\u00e7 doktrinini ortaya \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131. Libya hava sahas\u0131n\u0131n kapat\u0131lmas\u0131, Libyal\u0131 pilotlar d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda kimseye zarar vermeyecek t\u00fcrden bir askeri eylem bi\u00e7imiydi. Bu y\u00f6ntem, Libya’y\u0131 istila ve i\u015fgal etmeden Kaddafi \u00fczerinde ezici bir bask\u0131 kurmaya imk\u00e2n vermesiyle, Libya ve Irak \u00f6rneklerini ayr\u0131\u015ft\u0131rma ihtiyac\u0131na da yan\u0131t vermi\u015f oldu.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Elbette, tek ba\u015f\u0131na hava sahas\u0131n\u0131n kapat\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131n etkisiz ve \u00f6nemsiz oldu\u011fu anla\u015f\u0131ld\u0131 ve ayn\u0131 g\u00fcn Frans\u0131zlar Kaddafi g\u00fc\u00e7lerini bombalamaya ba\u015flad\u0131lar. Karada \u00f6lenler ise \u0130ngiliz, Frans\u0131z ya da Amerikal\u0131lar de\u011fil, Libyal\u0131lard\u0131. Hava sahas\u0131n\u0131n kapat\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 resmi olarak ilan edilirken, net bir biti\u015f tarih belirtilmeden hava sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmeye devam etti. \u0130nsan haklar\u0131 aktivistleri i\u00e7in bu durum, onlar\u0131 hava sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n her zaman istenmeyen \u00f6l\u00fcmlere neden oldu\u011fu kayg\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131 dile getirmekten al\u0131koydu. H\u00fck\u00fcmetler i\u00e7inse bu durum, \u00f6ncesinde \u201clekesiz m\u00fcdahale\u201d olarak ifade etti\u011fim bir \u015fekilde g\u00f6r\u00fclmelerini sa\u011flayacak bir durum yaratm\u0131\u015ft\u0131.(45)<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Askeri m\u00fcdahalenin desteklenmesi ya da kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131k\u0131lmas\u0131na dair arg\u00fcmanlar, sa\u011f kanat ele\u015ftirmenleri M\u00fcsl\u00fcman bir \u00fclkede ba\u015fka bir sava\u015f ihtimalinden \u00f6t\u00fcr\u00fc ikiye b\u00f6lm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. Fakat bu tart\u0131\u015fma, Kaddafi’nin ayaklanmay\u0131 ezmesi durumunda, bunun devrimlerle y\u00fczle\u015fen di\u011fer diktat\u00f6rlere de \u00f6rnek olaca\u011f\u0131 kayg\u0131s\u0131 duyan sol i\u00e7inde de meydana geldi. Bu yayg\u0131n ve g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc olmakla birlikte, emperyalizmin niyetlerini \u00f6nemsizle\u015ftiren bir g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. Tutarl\u0131 bir emperyalizm kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 olan Gilbert Achcar, solun m\u00fcdahaleyi desteklemekten ba\u015fka bir \u015fans\u0131 olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 iddia etti. Znet i\u00e7in haz\u0131rlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 yaz\u0131n\u0131n etkileyici bir b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcnde, \u015f\u00f6yle diyordu:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Solda oldu\u011funu iddia eden herhangi biri, emperyalist haydutlar\u0131n ara\u00e7lar\u0131yla olsa dahi, bir halk hareketinin korunma talebini g\u00f6rmezden gelebilir mi, e\u011fer ki talep edilen korunma emperyalistlerin \u00fclkelerini denetim alt\u0131na almalar\u0131n\u0131 engelleyecek bir bi\u00e7imdeyse? Benim sol anlay\u0131\u015f\u0131ma g\u00f6re \u015f\u00fcphesiz ki, hay\u0131r. Hi\u00e7bir ger\u00e7ek ilerici, ayaklanman\u0131n korunma talebini g\u00f6rmezlikten gelemez.(46)<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

M\u00fcdahalenin destek\u00e7ileri, Bingazi’nin yeni bir Srebrenitsa olma tehlikesiyle kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya oldu\u011funu iddia ediyorlard\u0131. E\u011fer Bat\u0131 katliam\u0131 engellemekte ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z olursa, Libya devriminin ba\u015fkentinin maruz kald\u0131\u011f\u0131 tehdit durumunda, su\u00e7lu, kabahatli duruma d\u00fc\u015fecektik. Bu \u015fartlar\u0131 en kat\u0131 y\u00fcrekli insan\u0131n \u00f6n\u00fcne dahi koysan\u0131z, b\u00f6yle bir m\u00fcdahaleyi reddedemezdi. Ama bu, hik\u00e2yenin yaln\u0131zca yar\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 olu\u015fturuyordu. Kanl\u0131 Balkan Sava\u015flar\u0131’ndan do\u011fan insani m\u00fcdahale, bir milyondan fazla insan\u0131n \u00f6ld\u00fc\u011f\u00fc, \u00e7ok daha kanl\u0131 Irak i\u015fgalinin bir mazeretine d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. Bu \u00e7er\u00e7evede yap\u0131lan ahlaki tart\u0131\u015fma, \u00f6l\u00fcmlerin say\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir tart\u0131\u015fma haline geliyor. Bunun yerine, emperyal g\u00fc\u00e7lerin insani m\u00fcdahalenin me\u015fruiyetini kullanarak bu f\u0131rsatlar\u0131, ba\u015fka sava\u015flar\u0131 hakl\u0131 g\u00f6stermek i\u00e7in nas\u0131l kulland\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 anlamak zorunday\u0131z.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bat\u0131 m\u00fcdahalesini reddetmek i\u00e7in \u00e7ok daha temel bir neden var. \u0130ki kilit Arap \u00fclkesinde patlak veren devrimle sars\u0131lan Bat\u0131l\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7ler, Kuzey Afrika’ya yeniden yerle\u015fmek i\u00e7in bir f\u0131rsat g\u00f6rd\u00fcler. Yaln\u0131zca petrol g\u00fcvenli\u011fini sa\u011flamak i\u00e7in de\u011fil ama ayn\u0131 zamanda Tunus ve M\u0131s\u0131r devrimleri aras\u0131nda Bat\u0131-yanl\u0131s\u0131 yeni bir rejim yaratmak i\u00e7in de, Libya cazip bir \u00f6d\u00fcld\u00fc. Bu kumar \u015fimdilik tutmu\u015f g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyor. Amerikan dergisi Foreign Affairs bunun ABD i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli bir zafer oldu\u011fundan emindi, fakat dergi bir uyar\u0131ya da yer veriyordu:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Libya lider Muammer Kaddafi’nin d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fc, ABD Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Barack Obama i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli bir d\u0131\u015f politika zaferidir. B\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fckl\u00fc bir strateji \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde, bu i\u015flemin yerine getirilmesi sorumlulu\u011funu ba\u015fkalar\u0131n\u0131n \u00fcstlenmesini sa\u011flarken, Obama y\u00f6netimi k\u0131sa vadeli hedefi olan Kaddafi’nin katliamlar\u0131n\u0131n durdurulmas\u0131 ile uzun vadeli hedefi olan iktidardan devrilmesini de ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirmeyi ba\u015fard\u0131. B\u00fct\u00fcn bunlar, karada hi\u00e7 ABD askeri kullan\u0131lmadan ve hi\u00e7bir askeri kay\u0131p verilmeden, makul bir finansal maliyetle halloldu. Bu s\u0131rada, [BM] Koruma Sorumlulu\u011fu ilkesinin ilk net askeri uygulamas\u0131 olarak Kaddafi’nin kesin yenilgisi, insani m\u00fcdahale yelkenini r\u00fczg\u00e2rla dolduracak, g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyor. Bununla birlikte, Libya deneyimi derslerini fazla abartmamak konusunda dikkatli olunmal\u0131. Libya, tekrarlanmas\u0131 pek de m\u00fcmk\u00fcn olmayan tekil bir \u00f6rnekti.(47)<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Libya’da sergilenen \u201cyumu\u015fak askeri g\u00fc\u00e7\u201d\u00fcn, b\u00f6lgenin geri kalan yerlerindeki hareketler i\u00e7in de belirli sonu\u00e7lar\u0131 oldu. Libya’da isyanc\u0131lar\u0131n zaferi, Suriye muhalefetinin de \u201cu\u00e7u\u015fa yasak b\u00f6lge\u201d talebinde bulunmas\u0131(48) <\/strong>ve kendilerine UGK’yi referans alarak hareket etmeleriyle birlikte(49)<\/strong>, Suriye’ye de benzer bir m\u00fcdahale beklentisini art\u0131rd\u0131. Suriye’deki karma\u015f\u0131k ko\u015fullar ve riskler, Bat\u0131l\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7lere \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131 yapma imk\u00e2n\u0131n\u0131 daraltmakla birlikte, m\u00fcdahale konusu Suriye hareketi i\u00e7erisinde de tart\u0131\u015f\u0131lmaya ba\u015fland\u0131. Suriyeli isyanc\u0131lar\u0131 desteklemek i\u00e7in devreye giren ve b\u00fcy\u00fcyen b\u00f6lgesel g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fc d\u0131\u015fa vuran \u00fclke, T\u00fcrkiye idi. Suriye ayaklanmas\u0131, bir yandan Kaddafi-sonras\u0131 Libya’da meydana gelen yeni gerilimlerle NATO’nun askeri ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131 t\u00f6rp\u00fclenirken, Bat\u0131 emperyalizminin yenilenen g\u00fcveninin s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6sterdi. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Libya’n\u0131n Yeni K\u0131rm\u0131z\u0131 \u00c7izgileri<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u015eimdi yeni Libya’n\u0131n \u00f6nderli\u011fi i\u00e7in verilen bir m\u00fccadele var. Kaddafi rejiminin d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcn ard\u0131ndan UGK’nin Bat\u0131 destekli liderleri, isyanc\u0131lar\u0131n saflar\u0131n\u0131n \u201cKatar taraf\u0131ndan finanse edilen\u201d \u0130slamc\u0131larla dolu oldu\u011fu uyar\u0131s\u0131nda bulunarak, eski m\u00fcttefiklerine s\u0131rtlar\u0131n\u0131 d\u00f6nm\u00fc\u015f durumdalar. \u0130slamc\u0131lar\u0131n yak\u0131n bir zamanda iktidar\u0131 ele ge\u00e7irebileceklerine ve Libya’n\u0131n \u201cTalibanla\u015fmas\u0131\u201dna dair kulak t\u0131rmalay\u0131c\u0131 uyar\u0131lar, \u0130slamc\u0131 hareketlerin \u00e7eli\u015fkili do\u011fas\u0131n\u0131n \u00fczerinden atl\u0131yor. \u0130slamc\u0131lar otokratik rejimlere kar\u015f\u0131 tepki g\u00f6sterebilir ve Bat\u0131l\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7ler onlara destek \u00e7\u0131kar ama \u0130slamc\u0131lar ayn\u0131 zamanda istikrarl\u0131 kapitalist ekonomiler in\u015fa etmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131rlar. \u0130slamc\u0131lar k\u00f6kl\u00fc toplumsal de\u011fi\u015fimleri engellemek i\u00e7in bu devrimi frenlemek ve y\u00f6nlendirmek istiyorlar. Libya’y\u0131 T\u00fcrkiye modelini referans alarak bi\u00e7imlendirmek hedefindeler.(50)<\/strong> L\u0130SG’in 1990’lardaki \u201cter\u00f6rist\u201d stratejisi, o d\u00f6nemde \u00e7at\u0131\u015ft\u0131klar\u0131 rejimin do\u011fas\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan bi\u00e7imlendirilmi\u015fti. Halk ayaklanmas\u0131 bir kez patlak verince \u0130slamc\u0131lar, \u00f6zellikle do\u011fuda, kendi ideolojilerini payla\u015fmayan halkla beraber m\u00fccadeleye kat\u0131ld\u0131lar.(51)<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

UGK i\u00e7in yeni Libya t\u0131pk\u0131 eski Libya gibi olacakt\u0131r, yaln\u0131zca Kaddafi’nin etraf\u0131ndaki k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck klik tasfiye edilecek ve gelecekte bir se\u00e7im yap\u0131laca\u011f\u0131n\u0131n vaadi verilecektir. Trablus’ta ikinci ayaklanma patlak verdi\u011finde, UGK eski rejimin b\u00fcrokratlar\u0131n\u0131n, memurlar\u0131n\u0131n i\u015flerine devam etmesini kesinle\u015ftirme gayretindeydi.(52)<\/strong> Buna kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k, Bat\u0131 destekli liderler yeni h\u00fck\u00fcmette, Berberilerin temsilcileri de d\u00e2hil olmak \u00fczere isyanc\u0131 hiziplerin temsilcilerine yer vermeyince, \u015eeyh Sallabi gibi \u00f6nemli \u0130slamc\u0131 liderler UGK liderlerini \u201cdevrimi \u00e7almakla\u201d su\u00e7lad\u0131lar. \u0130syanc\u0131lar\u0131n \u00e7o\u011fu i\u00e7in Bat\u0131 ile ittifak uygun ko\u015fullardan kaynaklan\u0131yordu. Bat\u0131l\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7ler yeni h\u00fck\u00fcmetin d\u00fczenlemesine giri\u015fti\u011finde, \u201cRejime sad\u0131k kesimlerle isyanc\u0131lar\u201d kar\u015f\u0131tl\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u201csek\u00fclerlere kar\u015f\u0131 \u0130slamc\u0131lar\u201d s\u00f6ylemiyle yer de\u011fi\u015ftirdi.(53)<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bat\u0131 m\u00fcdahalesinin sava\u015fta iki temel amac\u0131 vard\u0131. \u0130lki, rejimin d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fc h\u0131zland\u0131rmak ve Kuzey Afrika’daki merkezi rol\u00fcn\u00fc g\u00fcvence alt\u0131na almak. \u0130kincisi, Irak ve Afganistan facialar\u0131n\u0131n ard\u0131ndan insani m\u00fcdahale doktrinini yeniden sayg\u0131nl\u0131\u011fa kavu\u015fturmak. \u0130ki ama\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131 da belirli bir noktaya kadar ba\u015fard\u0131klar\u0131 bir ger\u00e7ek. Fakat, Libya’daki dayanak noktalar\u0131 g\u00fcvenilir olmaktan hen\u00fcz olduk\u00e7a uzak. Devrim toplumsal g\u00fc\u00e7leri, a\u011f\u0131r silahlarla donanm\u0131\u015f milisler bi\u00e7iminde a\u00e7\u0131\u011fa \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131. UGK bug\u00fcn bu g\u00fc\u00e7leri denetim alt\u0131na almakta olduk\u00e7a zorlan\u0131yor. Bat\u0131, kara birliklerine sahip olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir durumda, UGK’deki m\u00fcttefiklerinin, zaferini koruyaca\u011f\u0131na g\u00fcvenmek zorunda. Bu, ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilmesi bomba ya\u011fd\u0131rmaktan daha zorlu bir g\u00f6rev. UGK’n\u0131n Bat\u0131l\u0131 destek\u00e7ileri, halk\u0131n ayaklanmayla a\u00e7\u0131\u011fa \u00e7\u0131kan beklentilerini payla\u015fm\u0131yorlar.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

UGK’n\u0131n tasarlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 neoliberal reform programlar\u0131na veya i\u00e7 sava\u015fta merkezi bir rol oynayan milislerin silahs\u0131zland\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 kampanyas\u0131na ne gibi tepkiler gelece\u011fini kestirmek g\u00fc\u00e7. Fakat bu uygulamalar\u0131n halk\u0131n tepkisini \u00e7ekece\u011fine \u015f\u00fcphe yok. Libya Devrimi tamamlanm\u0131\u015f olmaktan \u00e7ok uzak. Trablus’taki ikinci ayaklanma kitleleri yeniden soka\u011fa \u00e7ekti ve rejimin d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fc takiben, Libya petrol i\u015f\u00e7ileri, M\u00fcbarek’in d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcn ard\u0131ndan M\u0131s\u0131r’\u0131 girdab\u0131na alan grev dalgas\u0131yla benzerlik i\u00e7inde, eski rejimin y\u00f6neticilerinin tasfiyesi talebiyle greve \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. Arap d\u00fcnyas\u0131ndaki devrimler hen\u00fcz karars\u0131z yap\u0131daki birinci a\u015famalar\u0131ndalar, fakat de\u011fi\u015fimi sa\u011flayacak ve denetim alt\u0131na al\u0131nmas\u0131 olduk\u00e7a zor g\u00fc\u00e7leri a\u00e7\u0131\u011fa \u00e7\u0131karm\u0131\u015f durumdalar.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Libya Devrimi’nin kat etti\u011fi yol, Tunus ve M\u0131s\u0131r’\u0131nkilerden farkl\u0131l\u0131k g\u00f6steriyor fakat, bu devrimlerin dikkate de\u011fer benzerlikleri de var. B\u00fct\u00fcn bu devrimlerde meydana gelen sonu\u00e7lar, beklentilerin uza\u011f\u0131na d\u00fc\u015fm\u00fc\u015f durumda. M\u0131s\u0131rl\u0131lar, eski rejimin yap\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 devam ettirmekte olduk\u00e7a kararl\u0131 yeni bir askeri y\u00f6netim buldular. Bu y\u00f6netim nefret edilen ola\u011fan\u00fcst\u00fc hal yasas\u0131n\u0131, neoliberalizmi ve polisin bask\u0131n konumunu s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmekte de kararl\u0131. M\u0131s\u0131r’da devrimin derinle\u015fmesinde belirgin bir geli\u015fme olmakla birlikte, Libya i\u00e7in de benzer bir durumdan s\u00f6z edilebilir (Petrol i\u015f\u00e7ilerinin grevi bunun \u00f6rneklerden biridir). Libya’daki devrimin gelece\u011finin kaderi, M\u0131s\u0131r ve M\u0131s\u0131r’daki devrimin geli\u015fimine ba\u011fl\u0131. UGK ve silahl\u0131 milisler aras\u0131ndaki gerilim Libya’daki \u00e7eli\u015fkinin bir par\u00e7as\u0131n\u0131 olu\u015ftururken, emperyalizmin genel hedefleri bu \u00e7eli\u015fkinin bir di\u011fer par\u00e7as\u0131n\u0131 meydana getiriyor. Kaddafi-sonras\u0131 Libya ger\u00e7e\u011fi g\u00fcn y\u00fcz\u00fcne \u00e7\u0131karken, devrim kimin i\u00e7indi sorusu da tekrar g\u00fcndeme gelecek.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

9 Ocak 2012<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dipnotlar:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

1.)<\/strong> Vanderwalle, Dirk, A History of Modern Libya, Cambridge University Press<\/em>, 2006, s.51<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2.)<\/strong> Age<\/em>, s. 34<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3.)<\/strong> Age<\/em>, s. 32<\/p>\n\n\n\n

4.)<\/strong> Age<\/em>, s. 31<\/p>\n\n\n\n

5.)<\/strong> Age<\/em>, s. 42<\/p>\n\n\n\n

6.)<\/strong> Age<\/em>, s. 54<\/p>\n\n\n\n

7.)<\/strong> Age<\/em>., s. 79<\/p>\n\n\n\n

8.)<\/strong> Age<\/em>., s. 83<\/p>\n\n\n\n

9.)<\/strong> Age<\/em>., s. 99<\/p>\n\n\n\n

10.)<\/strong> Vanderwalle, 2006, s. 143<\/p>\n\n\n\n

11.)<\/strong> Schwettmann, J\u00fcrgen, Youth Employment and Social Dialogue in the Maghreb Region<\/em> (International Labour Organisation), www.ilo.org\/public\/english\/region\/eurpro\/brussels\/downloads\/youthemploymentafrica.pdf, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

12.)<\/strong> Otman, Waniss A, ve Erling Karlberg, The Libyan Economy: Economic Diversification and International Repositioning, \u00a0 Springer, 2007, s. 36.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

13.)<\/strong> Glass, Charles, \u201cHizbullah\u2019s Part in Gaddafi\u2019s Downfall\u201d, The London Review of Books<\/em> (24 Ekim), www.charlesglass.net\/archives\/2011\/10\/hizbullahs_part.html, 2011<\/p>\n\n\n\n

14.) <\/strong>Vanderwalle, 2006, s. 194-196.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

15.) <\/strong>Basketter, Simon, \u201cLockerbie: Cynicism, Hypocrisy and Deceit\u201d, Socialist Review<\/em> (Eyl\u00fcl), www.socialistreview.org.uk\/article.php?articlenumber=10923, 2009.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

16.)<\/strong> Vanderwalle, 2006, s. 63<\/p>\n\n\n\n

17.)<\/strong> Al-Hayat<\/em>, 20 Ekim 1995.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

18.)<\/strong> Oman Tribune, \u201cJibril \u2018Stealing Revolution\u2019: Sallabi\u201d (9 Kas\u0131m), www.omantribune.com\/index.php?page=news&id=100824&heading=Other%20Top%20Stories, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

19.)<\/strong> National Counterterrorism Center, \u201cCurrent List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations\u201d, www.nctc.gov\/site\/other\/fto.html, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

20.) <\/strong>Oman Tribune, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

21.) <\/strong>New Yorker, \u201cEighty-Nine Questions: What did Libya do for The CIA?\u201d (3 Eyl\u00fcl), www.newyorker.com\/online\/blogs\/closeread\/2011\/09\/eighty-nine-questions-what-did-libya-do-for-the-cia.html, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

22.)<\/strong> Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor,<\/em> \u201cThe Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)\u201d, volume 3, issue 6, www.jamestown.org\/single\/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=308, 2005.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

23.)<\/strong> Stratfor Global Intelligence<\/em>, \u201cJihadist Opportunities in Libya\u201d (30 A\u011fustos), www.stratfor.com\/weekly\/20110223-jihadist-opportunities-libya, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

24.)<\/strong> Financial Times<\/em>, \u201cWest\u2019s Policy Exposed as \u2018Mad Dog\u2019 Finds Bite\u201d (21 \u015eubat), www.ft.com\/cms\/s\/0\/f068d70e-3ddd-11e0-99ac-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1cuoOrXLc, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

25.)<\/strong> Gulf News<\/em>, \u201cLibya Reaches Out to Multinationals\u201d (2 Haziran), http:\/\/gulfnews.com\/business\/oil-gas\/libya-reaches-out-to-multinationals-1.182575, 2007.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

26.)<\/strong> O\u2019Huiginn, Dan, \u201cEU arms sales to Libya: fleshing out the figures\u201d (25 \u015eubat), http:\/\/ohuiginn.net\/mt\/2011\/02\/eu_libya_arms_press_review.html, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

27.)<\/strong> Noll, Gregor, Mariagiulia Giuffr\u00e9, \u201cEU Migration Control: Made by Gaddafi?\u201d, Open Democracy<\/em> (25 \u015eubat), www.opendemocracy.net\/gregor-noll-mariagiulia-giuffr\u00e9\/eu-migration-control-made-by-gaddafi, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

28.)<\/strong> Al-Jazeera<\/em>, \u201cGaddafi\u2019s son talks of conspiracy\u201d (20 \u015eubat), http:\/\/english.aljazeera.net\/news\/africa\/2011\/02\/2011220232725966251.html, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

29.)<\/strong> New York Times<\/em>, \u201cTerror Quiets Libyan Capital as Rebels Battle in the East\u201d (3 Mart), www.nytimes.com\/2011\/03\/04\/world\/africa\/04libya.html?_r=3&ref=global-home, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

30.)<\/strong> Al-Jazeera<\/em>, \u201cDefiant Gaddafi confined to Tripoli\u201d (27 \u015eubat), www.aljazeera.com\/news\/africa\/2011\/02\/201122792426740496.html, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

31.) <\/strong>Al-Jazeera<\/em>, \u201cLibya opposition launches council\u201d (27 \u015eubat), http:\/\/english.aljazeera.net\/\/news\/africa\/2011\/02\/2011227175955221853.html, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

32.)<\/strong> Al-Arabiya<\/em>, \u201cGaddafi tells Benghazi his army is coming tonight\u201d (17 Mart), www.alarabiya.net\/articles\/2011\/03\/17\/141999.html, 2011<\/p>\n\n\n\n

33.)<\/strong> Huffington Post<\/em>, \u201cLibyan Rebels Plead For No-Fly Zone\u201d (12 Mart), www.huffingtonpost.com\/2011\/03\/12\/libyan-rebels-plead-for-n_n_834886.html, 2011<\/p>\n\n\n\n

34.)<\/strong> Asian Tribune<\/em>, \u201cLibyan rebellion has radical Islamist fervor: Benghazi link to Islamic militancy: US Military Document Reveals\u201d (17 Mart), www.asiantribune.com\/news\/2011\/03\/17\/libyan-rebellion-has-radical-islamist-fervor-benghazi-link-islamic-militancyus-milit, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

35.)<\/strong> Wall Street Journal<\/em>, \u201cRebels Fight US for Funds It Seized\u201d, (9 Nisan), http:\/\/online.wsj.com\/article\/SB10001424052748704503104576251160239688124.html, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

36.)<\/strong> Reuters<\/em>, \u201cLibya to honour all legal oil deals\u201d (24 A\u011fustos), uk.reuters.com\/article\/2011\/08\/24\/uk-libya-oil-contracts-idUKTRE77N24820110824, 2011<\/p>\n\n\n\n

37.)<\/strong> National Transitional Council, \u201cStatement of the Transitional National Council on Counter-Terrorism\u201d (30 Mart), www.ntclibya.org\/english\/counter-terrorism\/, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

38.)<\/strong> Daily Telegraph<\/em>, \u201cLibya: perilous voyage to help besieged rebels in Misurata\u201d (11 Nisan), www.telegraph.co.uk\/news\/worldnews\/africaandindianocean\/libya\/8444041\/Libya-perilous-voyage-to-help-besieged-rebels-in-Misurata.html, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

39.)<\/strong> Guardian<\/em>, \u201cMisrata rebels defy Libya\u2019s new regime\u201d (29 A\u011fustos), www.guardian.co.uk\/world\/2011\/aug\/29\/misrata-rebels-defy-libya-regime, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

40.)<\/strong> Human Rights Investigations<\/em>, \u201cLibyan rebel ethnic cleansing and lynching of black people\u201d (7 Temmuz), http:\/\/humanrightsinvestigations.org\/2011\/07\/07\/libya-ethnic-cleansing\/, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

41.)<\/strong> Reuters<\/em>, \u201cSpecial report: The secret plan to take Tripoli\u201d (6 Eyl\u00fcl), www.reuters.com\/article\/2011\/09\/06\/us-libya-endgame-idUSTRE7853C520110906, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

42.)<\/strong> Age.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

43.)<\/strong> \u0130ngiltere Ba\u015fbakan\u0131 David Cameron\u2019\u0131n \u00e7okk\u00fclt\u00fcrl\u00fcl\u00fc\u011fe kar\u015f\u0131 \u00f6ne \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131\u011f\u0131, yabanc\u0131 ve g\u00f6\u00e7men kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 yeni konsept (\u00e7.n.).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

44.)<\/strong> Atlantic<\/em>, \u201cThe Strikes on Libya: Humanitarian Intervention, Not Imperial Aggression\u201d (19 Mart), www.theatlantic.com\/international\/archive\/2011\/03\/the-strikes-on-libya-humanitarian-intervention-not-imperial-aggression\/72740\/, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

45.) <\/strong>Stratfor Global Intelligence<\/em>, \u201cLibya: A Premature Victory Celebration\u201d (30 A\u011fustos), www.stratfor.com\/weekly\/20110829-libya-premature-victory-celebration, 2011<\/p>\n\n\n\n

46.)<\/strong> Achcar, Gilbert, \u201cLibya: a legitimate and necessary debate from an anti-imperialist perspective\u201d, Znet (25 Mart), www.zcommunications.org\/libya-a-legitimate-and-necessary-debate-from-an-anti-imperialist-perspective-by-gilbert-achcar, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

47.)<\/strong> Stewart, Patrick, \u201cLibya and the future of humanitarian intervention\u201d Foreign Affairs<\/em> (26 A\u011fustos), www.foreignaffairs.com\/articles\/68233\/stewart-patrick\/libya-and-the-future-of-humanitarian-intervention, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

48.)<\/strong> Los Angeles Times<\/em>, \u201cSyria protesters reportedly demand \u2018no fly\u2019 zone\u201d (28 Ekim), http:\/\/articles.latimes.com\/2011\/oct\/28\/world\/la-fg-syria-protests-20111029, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

49.)<\/strong> BBC<\/em>, \u201cQ&A: Syrian opposition alliance\u201d (16 Kas\u0131m), www.bbc.co.uk\/news\/world-middle-east-15155804, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

50.)<\/strong> Daily Telegraph<\/em>, \u201cLibyan cleric announces new party on lines of \u2018moderate\u2019 Islamic democracy\u201d (10 Kas\u0131m), www.telegraph.co.uk\/news\/worldnews\/africaandindianocean\/libya\/8879955\/Libyan-cleric-announces-new-party-on-lines-of-moderate-Islamic-democracy.html, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

51.)<\/strong> New York Times<\/em>, \u201cDiverse character in city Qaddafi calls Islamist\u201d (7 Mart), www.nytimes.com\/2011\/03\/08\/world\/middleeast\/08darnah.html?_r=3, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

52.)<\/strong> Reuters<\/em>, \u201cSpecial report: The secret plan to take Tripoli\u201d (6 Eyl\u00fcl), www.reuters.com\/article\/2011\/09\/06\/us-libya-endgame-idUSTRE7853C520110906, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

53.)<\/strong> Los Angeles Time<\/em>s, \u201cIslamists take aim at Libya rebels\u2019 secular leaders\u201d (13 Eyl\u00fcl), http:\/\/articles.latimes.com\/2011\/sep\/13\/world\/la-fg-libya-factions-20110914, 2011.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Simon Assaf Ortado\u011fu’da devrimler, de\u011fi\u015fmez zannedilen b\u00fct\u00fcn bir b\u00f6lge boyunca ve kendi \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 ad\u0131na hareket etmekten aciz say\u0131lan insanlar\u0131n m\u00fcdahalesiyle, bir g\u00f6k g\u00fcr\u00fclt\u00fcs\u00fc gibi patlad\u0131. Devrimlerin tarihe g\u00f6m\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fc fikri art\u0131k inzivaya \u00e7ekildi. Gen\u00e7lerin eylemleri ve protestolar\u0131n cesurlu\u011fu, on y\u0131llard\u0131r bask\u0131 ve retorik \u00fczerine kurulu rejimleri parampar\u00e7a etti. Bu \u201cgen\u00e7lik devrimleri\u201d t\u00fcm b\u00f6lgeyi ortak talepler etraf\u0131nda […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":301,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_active":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_note":"","_exactmetrics_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[644],"tags":[369,367,368],"class_list":["post-300","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-arap-devrimleri","tag-ayriminda","tag-libya","tag-yol"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/trockist.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/300","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/trockist.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/trockist.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trockist.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/8"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trockist.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=300"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/trockist.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/300\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":302,"href":"https:\/\/trockist.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/300\/revisions\/302"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trockist.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/301"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/trockist.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=300"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trockist.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=300"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trockist.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=300"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}